Archive for the 'Abroad' Category

Did Blair and Brown fail on inequality?

June 1, 2009

In a Financial Times op-ed, Matthew Engel says

This month, it was revealed that the UK’s Gini coefficient, measuring inequality between rich and poor, had reached its highest level on record — after the longest period of Labour government ever. You do not have to be a Labour voter to wonder what, then, has been the point of it all.

I wouldn’t want to offer a full-scale defense of the Labour governments’ strategy (see ch. 11 of this book for my views), but there is a reasonable response to this particular challenge. Inequality of market incomes has been increasing almost everywhere. Arguably, it has risen less, and government has done more to mitigate its impact, under Labour than would have been the case under the Conservatives. It’s impossible to know that for certain, of course, but the following data on inflation-adjusted income growth during the most recent periods of Conservative and Labour rule are consistent with this assertion.

How does the U.S. labor market compare now?

May 26, 2009

In a new CEPR report, John Schmitt, Hye Jin Rho, and Shawn Fremstad note that while the U.S. unemployment rate had been lower than those of many rich European countries in the 1980s and 1990s, it now has caught up to and surpassed most of them. In March of this year our unemployment rate was tied for fourth-highest among the major OECD nations. This, they say, “has turned the case for the U.S. model almost entirely on its head.” (Floyd Norris in the New York Times and John Quiggin at Crooked Timber have also picked up this story.)

I’m sympathetic to the conclusion, but I’d prefer it to be based on a different measure of labor market performance.

The unemployment rate is calculated as the number of people looking for work but without a job (unemployed) divided by the number of people either employed or unemployed. Its weakness is that it takes no account of people who aren’t seeking work because they doubt they could find a satisfactory job or have given up trying. The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics has broader unemployment measures that try to incorporate this, but there aren’t cross-nationally comparable data for those measures.

If our interest is in an economy’s success in creating jobs, a better indicator for cross-country comparison is the employment rate: the share of working-age people (age 15 to 64 is the standard) that are employed. The following chart shows employment rates for the two most recent business-cycle peak years: 2000 and 2007. The U.S. is one of just a few nations in which the employment rate declined during this period, though it’s in the middle of the pack rather than at the bottom.

What’s happened since then? Employment rates aren’t updated as regularly as unemployment rates, so recent trends are more difficult to judge. The data below are the best I can do at the moment. They show percentage change in the number (not share) of people employed from the fourth quarter of 2007 to the fourth quarter of 2008, and for a few countries to the first quarter of 2009. Our economy has lost more jobs — 4.5%, or about 6.5 million jobs — than most others.

The American labor market hasn’t been the worst at creating and maintaining jobs in the 2000s (though bear in mind that we’re talking here solely about the number of jobs, not their quality). Yet as Schmitt, Rho, and Fremstad rightly suggest, things have changed sharply relative to the 1980s and 1990s when our performance was near the top of the comparative heap.

Sublime Barça

April 26, 2009

I grew up playing soccer and continue to enjoy the game, but my interest as a spectator has waxed and waned over the years. I’ve never been loyal to a particular team in a way that leads one to stay tuned even when times aren’t good, so my attentiveness hinges largely on the quality of the teams I’m able to watch. Two things have helped to rekindle it in recent years. One is television coverage of the English and Italian leagues via Fox Soccer Channel. The other is globalization. The European clubs (see the chart below) with the most money, and to some extent tradition, are able to lure the best players from all over the world — from Argentina to the Ivory Coast. The resulting concentration of talent makes these teams much more attractive to watch than was the case when many had only two or three foreign players. The combinations don’t always work; bloated egos and lack of chemistry sometimes get in the way. But on the whole, this has been a boon for fans with TV access and no allegiance to a club or country that’s been left behind by this process.

This year has been especially pleasurable, because Barcelona have a delightful team. Their front five — Lionel Messi (Argentina), Samuel Eto’o (Cameroon), Thierry Henry (France), Andrés Iniesta (Spain), and Xavi Hernández (Spain) — are a joy to watch. Messi has more skill on the ball than anyone since Diego Maradona and is probably the world’s best player at the moment. Eto’o, lightening quick with excellent touch around the goal, has scored 125 goals for Barcelona in the last five seasons. Henry has been one of the world’s top three forwards over the past decade; he’s slightly past his peak form, but still very good. Xavi and Iniesta are exquisite dribblers and passers whose talents and personalities seem ideally suited to bringing out the best in Messi, Eto’o, and Henry.

As one indicator this Barça team’s quality, here’s their goal difference — average goals scored minus goals allowed — this year compared to that of the nine other clubs that dominate European and world club soccer. (Since 1990, these teams have won 14 of the 19 Champions League tournaments, including 10 of the last 11. One of them will win it again this year, as all four semifinalists are among this group.) I’ve included both regular league and Champions League matches.

If you’ve been tempted by soccer but found it boring, consider watching Barcelona play in the Champions League semifinals this Tuesday and next Wednesday (April 28 and May 6). The matches will be shown on ESPN2 at 2:45pm eastern time. I can’t guarantee it’ll be worth your time; at this stage of major competitions (the Champions League is soccer’s biggest aside from the World Cup), teams often play cautiously. But I’d advise against waiting. The style and flair of this team come along very rarely, and all it takes is a juicy offer from another club or an injury to one of the key players to destroy it.

I should say that I wouldn’t bet on Barcelona winning the Champions League this season. They’re a bit suspect defensively, and in any case in soccer, as in many sports, the most attractive team doesn’t always come out on top. But for at least some fans, the outcome is a secondary consideration when you’re able to see what Pelé once called “the beautiful game” played so beautifully.

Things a rich country can do

February 16, 2009

Europe doesn’t have all the answers, but here’s one thing that merits envy (audio, 4 minutes).

More than three million dead

January 14, 2009

The last sentence of this paragraph from Todd Moss’ book African Development caught me off guard.

Sometimes called “Africa’s World War,” the recent central African conflict has been fought mainly in the eastern parts of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC, formerly Zaire), but has directly involved at least seven countries and dozens of various militias. The war was initially sparked by civil war in Rwanda in 1994, when the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) chased the genocidal Interahamwe militia into then Zaire. Once the RPF had regained control of Rwanda and Zaire’s Mobutu was seen as protecting the Interahamwe, Rwanda launched an invasion, backed by Uganda and various Congolese factions opposed to Mobutu. The longtime Zairian leader was weak and increasingly isolated, and the Rwandan-backed rebels marched all the way to Kinshasa, deposing him in May 1997. Rwanda then set up a buffer zone along the border and continued to pursue the Interahamwe. But Rwanda fell out with the new Congolese president, Laurent Kabila, and relaunched the war in 1998. This time, Kabila was able to get help as Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe sent troops and halted the Rwandan and rebel advance. A stalemate ensued with the country carved up among multiple foreign armies and factions. Meanwhile, Rwanda and Uganda began to attack each other inside DRC, presumably fighting over spoils. In 2002 a nominal peace process got under way, allowing gradual withdrawal of the foreign armies and attempting to build a sustainable political situation in DRC. Estimates of the overall death toll from this war are 3-4 million, mostly Congolese civilians.

I hadn’t realized the death toll was that high. Another estimate puts it at 5.4 million. The DRC’s population is a little over 60 million.

For some perspective, here is the number of American deaths (both combat and noncombat) in our country’s major wars:

Revolutionary War: 25,000

Civil War: 625,000

World War I: 117,000

World War II: 405,000

Korea: 37,000

Vietnam: 58,000

Iraq: 4,000

Total deaths in the two world wars are estimated at 15-20 million and 50-70 million, respectively.

“I lost”

January 4, 2009

“I acknowledge the electoral commissioner’s declaration and congratulate Professor Mills.” These words are from Nana Akufo-Addo, who, according to the New York Times, has lost a run-off election for the presidency of Ghana by a very narrow margin. His acceptance of defeat may help Ghana avoid the type of violence produced by disputed election results in Zimbabwe, Kenya, and a variety of other countries in recent years.

There are, of course, circumstances in which the declared result is not fair and protest is justified. But nothing is more important to democracy than the normalization of peaceful transfer of power (Akufo-Addo’s party has held the presidency the past eight years). Here’s hoping this type of statement will be uttered many more times this year and into the future.

Update: Similar sentiment from Chris Blattman and Todd Moss.

Transition costs

January 2, 2009

In a 1980 article, Adam Przeworski tried to estimate the likely costs to workers in rich capitalist nations of a transition to socialism. He concluded that they were sizable enough to be a serious deterrent to socialist preferences.

History turned in the opposite direction: less than a decade later eastern Europe began its transition to capitalism. In The Economist‘s 2008 year-end special issue, Laza Kekic offers a two-decades-on estimate of the costs of that transition.

Leading the Way in Political Opportunity?

November 23, 2008

Following up a previous post on political opportunity in the United States and Europe, this graph shows the share of seats held by women in the main legislative body (parliament’s “lower” house) in the U.S. and nineteen other rich democracies. The data are from the Inter-Parliamentary Union. Though not far behind France, the United Kingdom, and Italy, America’s share is one of the lowest. When the new Congress convenes in January, women will hold just 17% of the seats in the House of Representatives (and 17% in the Senate). The figure for Germany is 32%. In Sweden, at the high end, it’s 47%.

A report on how women fared in the 2008 U.S. elections is here. A good introduction to cross-country differences and over-time developments is Women, Politics, and Power, by Pam Paxton and Melanie Hughes.

Europe Lagging in Political Opportunity?

November 14, 2008

Lagging in one respect, but in another perhaps not so much.

Earlier this week the New York Times ran a piece highlighting skepticism about whether a black or other racial minority politician could replicate Barack Obama’s feat in the not-too-distant future in France or Germany or the U.K. There’s a good bit of truth in this.

But then in today’s NYT I notice photos of Germany’s Chancellor Angela Merkel and France’s finance minister Christine Lagarde, and this reminds me that the U.K. elected a female prime minister nearly thirty years ago.

Jobs with Equality

July 31, 2008

My new book is titled Jobs with Equality. It’s available from Oxford University Press (the publisher), Amazon, Barnes and Noble, and others.

I’ve put the introductory chapter online.

Here’s a summary:

Income inequality has been rising in many of the world’s affluent countries, due to a variety of economic and social shifts. Redistribution can help, but government revenues are threatened by globalization and population aging. Like a growing number of observers, I see an increase in the employment rate as a way out of this impasse; it enlarges the tax base, allowing tax revenues to rise without an increase in tax rates. The question is: Can egalitarian institutions and policies be coupled with employment growth?

In the book I assess the experiences of rich nations since the late 1970s. I examine the impact on employment of six key policies and institutions: wage levels at the low end of the labor market, employment protection regulations, government benefit generosity, taxes, skills, and women-friendly policies.

It turns out that there is no parsimonious set of institutions and policies that have been key to good (or bad) employment performance. The comparative experience features multiple paths to employment success, including low-inequality ones. This suggests reason for optimism about possibilities for a high-employment, high-equality society.

Cover blurbs:

“This new book is a worthy successor to Lane Kenworthy’s much-acclaimed Egalitarian Capitalism. Combining academic rigor with a reader-friendly style, he explores how we might reconcile what many consider incompatible goals: more employment and greater equality. Drawing on systematic and empirically rich analyses, Kenworthy argues against any simplistic policy formula. The book makes especially lucrative reading when, in the latter half, it identifies the key ingredients of a win-win strategy. Jobs with Equality is destined to generate debate, all-the-while that it affirms Lane Kenworthy’s status as a leading scholar of social inequality.”  — Gøsta Esping-Andersen, Universitat Pompeu Fabra

“On the premise that high employment is essential to the realization of egalitarian goals in the contemporary era, this important book explores how social policies and institutional arrangements in advanced capitalist societies have affected employment growth over the last three decades. Kenworthy synthesizes existing literature and presents new empirical findings based on original cross-national data and measurements. His most important contribution is to explore multiple determinants of employment performance and interactions among these determinants in systematic fashion. Very sensibly, the analysis yields policy recommendations that are specific by institutional context. For students of comparative political economy, the particular questions that Kenworthy addresses are now settled for some time to come.” — Jonas Pontusson, Princeton University

Chapter list:

1. Introduction

PART I   EQUALITY

2. Why Should We Care About Inequality?

3. Sources of Equality and Inequality: Wages, Jobs, Households, and Redistribution

PART II   JOBS

4. Measuring and Analyzing Employment Performance

5. Low-End Wages

6. Employment Protection Regulations

7. Government Benefits

8. Taxes

9. Skills

10. Women-Friendly Policies

11. Toward a High-Employment, High-Equality Society

Is the U.S. a High-Inequality Country if Mobility Is Taken into Account?

July 20, 2008

Here is the conventional wisdom about income inequality in the United States compared to other rich countries:

The U.S. is the most unequal.

However, these data are based on households’ income in a single year. Averaging income over multiple years tends to reduce measured inequality. This is because of mobility; some people move up and/or down in the distribution over time. If the United States has more such mobility (relative intragenerational mobility) than other countries, the conventional single-year measure shown in this chart may overstate U.S. inequality relative to other countries.

Does the U.S. improve if we measure inequality using income averaged over a longer period of time?

Markus Gangl (University of Wisconsin), Joakim Palme (Institute for Futures Studies in Stockholm), and I have a paper that averages income over 18 years in Germany, Sweden, and the United States. Eighteen years isn’t a full work life, but it’s the best we can do with existing panel data sets. The following chart shows the findings. As the number of years over which income is averaged increases, the amount of measured inequality decreases. But it decreases at the same rate in each of the three countries. America’s position does not improve.

The full paper is here.

__________

* These numbers are my calculations from the Luxembourg Income Study database. To make them as comparable as possible to the data in the second chart here, they’re for households with a head age 25 to 59. Income is with government transfers included and taxes subtracted.

Euro 2008

June 19, 2008

Game on! Quarterfinal matchups:

Germany vs. Portugal (Thursday)

Croatia vs. Turkey (Friday)

Netherlands vs. Russia (Saturday)

Italy vs. Spain (Sunday)

Hope: based on their first-round form coupled with history of disappointment, I’ll root for Portugal, the Netherlands, and Spain, and perhaps for a Portugal-Spain final.

Expectation: a final that includes Germany or Italy, quite possibly both.

Sweden: Image and Reality

May 26, 2008

Sweden is often viewed as either social democratic paradise or lefty hell, depending on one’s political and economic orientation.

Parts of the popular image are true. Sweden has a strong political left; the Social Democratic party was in power continuously for more than four decades in the middle of the 20th century and has alternated in the government since then (it’s out at the moment). Around 80% of employed Swedes are union members, and 30% are employed by the government. More than half of the country’s GDP passes through the government in taxes, and government spending on redistributive transfers and public services is among the highest in the world. Income inequality is among the lowest. Female employment is high, and the gender pay gap is low. A 2008 Newsweek index of environmental performance put Sweden at the top. It is ranked as one of the world’s most peaceful nations.

Like all countries, though, Sweden is more complex than the stereotype suggests. Here are a few things that may surprise.

Surprises for the left

1. The country has a strong work ethos. The welfare state is generous, but most able-bodied Swedes of working age are expected to be employed. During the 2000s the Swedish employment rate has averaged about 74% of the working-age population, two percentage points higher than in the United States. The share of working-age Swedish households with no employed adult is 5%, the same as in the U.S.

2. Embrace of globalization. Exports and imports total around 45% of Swedish GDP, compared to 15% in the United States. Swedish policy aims to encourage trade and to cushion the adverse impact this inevitably has on some, ensuring their incomes remain at a decent level while they’re unemployed and facilitating transition to a different firm and/or occupation.

3. School choice. Since the early 1990s government funds have been provided not only to public elementary and secondary schools but also private ones, and parents are permitted to choose which school their children attend. This comes with strings attached: private schools wishing to receive the funding cannot base admission on ability, religion, or ethnicity. But in other relevant respects the public schools are forced to compete with private ones.

4. Partially privatized pensions. In the late 1990s a social democratic government introduced a “privatized” element into the Swedish pension system. 2.5% of employee earnings are put into a defined-contribution component. The employee has a variety of choices about how the money is invested. (A key difference between this reform and the one proposed by President Bush several years ago for the U.S.: Swedish payroll taxes were increased so that this added to the existing system, rather than replacing part of it.)

Surprises for the right

1. Sweden has a competitive economy. In the World Economic Forum’s 2007-08 “competitiveness index,” Sweden placed 4th out of 131 nations. It has been in the top ten, often among the top five, throughout this decade. Like the other Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, and Norway), Sweden has been successful at adapting to the shift from manufacturing to services and to a more globalized and competitive economic environment. These economies have done particularly well in high-tech industries. This owes to, among other things, high-quality educational systems, excellent public infrastructure, heavy R&D investment, and commitment to adaptation.

2. High mobility. For a long time the consensus view among researchers was that egalitarian countries such as Sweden have low inequality but also little mobility, whereas the United States has more inequality but also greater opportunity for upward and downward movement. Recent findings suggest this is wrong. Mobility in Sweden, both between generations and over the life course, is at least is great as in the United States and likely greater.

3. The poor are well-off absolutely, not just relatively. Critics of high taxes and generous government benefits sometimes imagine that these destroy economic growth, so that countries like Sweden have low inequality but also low absolute living standards. In fact, the incomes of those at the bottom of the distribution in Sweden are similar to those of their American counterparts. And Swedes work far fewer days and hours to get those incomes. They also enjoy more plentiful and higher-quality public services, from schools to child care to health care to public transportation to roads and parks.

4. Sweden is heterogeneous. Those skeptical about the applicability of Swedish policies and institutions often argue that to the extent Sweden “works,” it’s because it has an extremely homogeneous population. That was likely true half a century ago, but these days Sweden’s immigrant (foreign-born) share is virtually identical to America’s, at about 13% of the population. What effects this may have over the long run are hard to anticipate, but it’s been that way for more than a decade now.

Has Ireland’s Rising Tide Benefited Its Poor?

May 18, 2008

I’ve just returned from a week in Ireland. Since the mid-1980s the Irish economy has achieved rates of growth not seen in a rich nation since Japan in the 1960s. Ireland’s GDP per capita grew at more than 6% per year from 1987 to 2000, and at better than 3% per year in the 2000s so far.

Has this rising tide lifted all Irish boats?

One way to judge is by examining how the incomes of those at the bottom of the distribution have changed. The standard way to do this is via the poverty rate — the share of persons living in households with an income below the poverty line. The following chart shows poverty rates in 1987 and 2000 in Ireland and two comparison countries — Sweden and the United States. The data are from the Luxembourg Income Study database.

While the poverty rate in Sweden and the U.S. fell slightly over this period, it increased in Ireland. Really? Can it be that despite massive economic growth, things got worse for Ireland’s poor?

Well, it’s true that a large chunk of the economic growth during this period was due to multinational companies. Maybe most the proceeds of the growth went to their foreign owners. Yet even if that were the case, it’s hard to imagine how the Irish poor could have been left worse off than before. Lots more people were working; the employment rate jumped from 52% in 1987 to 66% in 2000. And this didn’t just consist of adding second earners in already-high-earning households; the share of working-age households with no employed member dropped by more than half. Moreover, wage levels among low-end workers rose (the statutory minimum wage is now €8.65 per hour).

The problem here lies in the poverty measure. In cross-country comparisons, poverty typically is measured in a “relative” manner: the poverty line used for each country is 50% of that country’s median income. That’s the mesure I’ve used here. Although this type of measure has some value, I don’t think it should be the headline indicator of poverty (more here and here). It depends too heavily on the distribution of income and too little on the absolute level of income. The reason Ireland’s relative poverty rate increased between 1987 and 2000 is not that households at the bottom became worse off in an absolute sense, but rather that the incomes of those households increased less rapidly than the incomes of households in the middle of the distribution.

The following chart offers a more useful way of gauging trends in poverty. It shows incomes at the tenth percentile of the distribution in the three countries. They’re adjusted for inflation and converted into U.S. dollars. (The incomes also are adjusted for household size. They represent those for a single adult; for a household of four, multiply by two.) These data indicate a sharp improvement in the incomes of Irish households at this low point in the distribution. In 1987 they were well below their Swedish and American counterparts, but by 2000 the gap had narrowed considerably.

The rising tide does appear to have lifted most Irish boats. One might, perhaps, complain that the degree of improvement has been disappointing given all that economic growth. But that’s quite different from suggesting, as the relative poverty measure does, that things have gotten worse.

This very helpful book has more discussion and analysis.

Top Incomes in the U.S. and Abroad

May 11, 2008

A key aspect of the rise in income inequality in the United States since the 1970s is the soaring incomes of the top 1%. Is this development unique to the U.S.?

Tony Atkinson, Andrew Leigh, Thomas Piketty, Emmanuel Saez, and others have used tax records to estimate the top 1%’s share of total income in a number of countries. Leigh has made a few adjustments to enhance comparability across the countries and posted the data on his website. He has a nice paper on the issue, which includes a version of the two charts shown below. (For more data and analysis see here, here, here, here, and here.) The data are for pretax incomes excluding capital gains.

It turns out that other English-speaking countries have experienced a similar trend:

Is this, then, simply the norm? No. In other affluent nations, the top 1%’s income share has increased only slightly or not at all during this period:

What accounts for these differing developments? We don’t know. Hypotheses abound, including differences in market competition, norms, labor power, government partisanship, tax systems, corporate governance practices, and demand for entertainment, athletic, and English-speaking executive talent. Because the data are relatively new, however, there has been limited systematic analysis as of yet.

Follow

Get every new post delivered to your Inbox.

Join 44 other followers