Archive for the 'Politics' Category

Elections, Campaigns, and Fundamentals

November 3, 2008

If Barack Obama wins the election, many analysts will attribute his victory to campaign strategies and events: Obama’s money advantage, the Obama campaign’s superior organizing effort and execution, the candidates’ debate performances, McCain’s choice to go negative relatively early, McCain’s message incoherence, and McCain’s choice of Sarah Palin for vice president, among others.

Meanwhile, Doug Hibbs’ “bread and peace” model predicts a popular vote share for the incumbent-party candidate (McCain) of 46.25%. This translates into about a 7-percentage-point win for Obama, which is almost exactly what poll averages compiled by Pollster.com, RealClearPolitics.com, and fivethirtyeight.com are suggesting as of today.

The Hibbs model is striking for its simplicity — its predictions are based on a single indicator of economic performance, supplemented by one foreign policy measure (see here) — and its effectiveness. The model’s track record since 1952 and its prediction for this year look like this:

As Brendan Nyhan points out, other predictions based on the “fundamentals” are in the same ballpark.

Campaigns surely do matter, but probably less, in this year and quite a few others, than we tend to think.

Ready to Go

October 30, 2008

“Obama prepares for quick transition,” reports Edward Luce in the Financial Times.

Good. Even in the most favorable scenario in terms of congressional support, a President Obama’s window of opportunity for getting major things such as health care reform done might well be short. Rick Perlstein has a nice piece on this in The American Prospect.

Seeing Clearly Now?

October 26, 2008

Frank Rich and Paul Krugman each have columns in today’s New York Times suggesting that voters’ movement toward Obama in the past several weeks stems from their finally “getting it.” Rich says Americans now recognize Republicans’ coded racial rhetoric as the cynical ploy it’s always been, while Krugman thinks the economic crisis has encouraged attention to seriousness and policy positions rather than impressions of elitism and likeability.

I suspect a simple “fundamentals” interpretation is more likely right. The economy is in crisis and Americans are unhappy with the current administration’s foreign policy. In this type of situation, independents tend to want a change of course. This is 1980 revisited. In fact, it’s 2006 revisited, though with the economy and foreign policy swapping places as the central issue.

Get elected. Do something good. Repeat.

October 22, 2008

In the cover story of the current issue of Newsweek, Jon Meachem argues that Barack Obama, if he wins the election, will have a difficult time pursuing a progressive agenda. This is a right-of-center nation, according to Meachem, and the experience of Democratic presidents from FDR to LBJ to Bill Clinton suggests that bold moves to the left bring electoral punishment and thence a shift back to the center. The current disappointment with the past eight years of Republican rule and the depth of the economic crisis may make it seem as though anything is possible, Meachem says, but Americans remain fundamentally conservative in temperament (dislike of change) and ideology (wary of government), so an Obama administration would do well to avoid overreach.

I think this is wrong. It’s not that I disagree with the claim that the United States is a right-of-center nation; compared to other rich countries, we clearly are. Nor do I think Meachem is mistaken in suggesting that progressive initiatives by an Obama administration might contribute to electoral reaction. But it does not follow from either or both of these suppositions that the wise course of action is to proceed cautiously.

A president’s chief goal should be to make the country a better place, not to win the next election. Even if it were true that the Democrats’ defeat in 1968 owed to liberal overreach in LBJ’s early years, would the country have been better off had Johnson and his congressional allies not pushed through the Civil Rights Act, Medicare/Medicaid, and Food Stamps? Perhaps they would have been passed a bit later and thereby generated less controversy, but it’s also possible that the moment would have been lost for a long time.

More important, presidents and parties don’t merely respond to public opinion; they can actively shape it. Despite their ideological conservatism, Americans are “programatically liberal”; they strongly favor a range of government programs, from public schools to Social Security and Medicare to the minimum wage and Earned Income Tax Credit. When government creates programs that work, Americans tend to support those programs (similar points made here and here). The United States may be an ideologically right-of-center country, but its center has steadily shifted left. That shift is in large part a consequence of government activism.

Bold action can also pay dividends politically, especially in periods of crisis. Franklin Roosevelt was elected in 1932 to do something about the depression, though most who voted for him probably weren’t sure exactly what they wanted him to do. Roosevelt and the Congress moved quickly to put in place a set of programs that enhanced economic security for ordinary Americans — Social Security, unemployment insurance, and a minimum wage, among others. These programs were widely perceived as helpful. And though the American public inevitably moved back toward Republicans in both congressional and presidential elections, the Democrats dominated American politics for a generation.

In the late 1970s the country again faced a perceived economic crisis, this time coupled with a foreign policy one (defeat in Vietnam followed by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and anti-American revolutions in Iran and Nicaragua). Like FDR, Ronald Reagan was elected because he proposed to change course. He cut taxes and sharply increased military spending. Rightly or wrongly, a significant share of Americans viewed this as helpful. Republicans suffered some setbacks in congressional elections and eventually lost the presidency for a while. But due in part to Reagan’s aggressive response to the crisis, the party improved its standing among the American public, which in turn contributed to its electoral success. The following chart shows the share of Americans identifying as Republicans and Democrats according to the main sources of such data, the National Election Studies and General Social Survey. The key thing to note is that the rise in Republican identification comes after the 1980 election, not before. (Unfortunately, these surveys began well after Roosevelt’s era.)

If Barack Obama is elected president, he’ll have no choice but to address the economic crisis. Beyond that, my guess is he’ll focus on health care, energy, economic security (perhaps pegging the minimum wage to inflation and reforming unemployment insurance), and taxes. History suggests that both he and his party might well benefit if he moves quickly and boldly, rather than cautiously. That’s the lesson of FDR and Reagan. The Clinton (health care) lesson is that whichever issues Obama chooses to prioritize, it’s critical that he get something done.

Sarah Palin and the American Public on Abortion

October 1, 2008

Since 1973 the General Social Survey has regularly asked American adults the following question: “Please tell me whether or not you think it should be possible for a pregnant woman to obtain a legal abortion if she became pregnant as a result of rape?”

Sarah Palin’s answer to this question is “no.” This chart shows the percentage of Americans who share her view and the percentage who do not. The data can be accessed here.

Are you better off now than you were eight years ago?

September 27, 2008

Answer here, from John Schmitt and Hye Jin Rho at the Center for Economic and Policy Research. Nicely done.

Update: Here is another take, by Jim Kessler, Mark Donnell, and Tess Stovall at Third Way.

Obama’s Antipoverty Agenda

September 24, 2008

Much of Barack Obama’s economic policy rhetoric is aimed at middle-class insecurity and anxiety, rather than poverty. On political grounds this is hardly surprising; there are a lot more middle-class voters than poor ones. And in the current economic climate, it seems reasonable. But his platform does include a variety of proposals that are likely to improve living standards for those at the low end of the income distribution. A few highlights (details here):

1. Health care

Obama’s health care proposal would extend affordable coverage to the 15% or so of Americans currently without it, many of whom are just below or a bit above the poverty line. And it would reduce health insurance costs for many who currently have it.

2. Earnings and incomes

He proposes to raise the minimum wage to $9.50 per hour in 2011 and index it to inflation. The following chart shows what that looks like in historical context (in today’s dollars and assuming an inflation rate of 2.5% over the next few years). Obama’s minimum wage would be pretty high, and indexing it would mean no more lengthy periods — such as 1981-1990 and 1997-2007 — of steady decline in its real value.

Obama would increase the Earned Income Tax Credit for working Americans with no children and for those with three or more children, though it isn’t clear by how much. As the next chart shows, the maximum EITC for those without kids is paltry at present, and families with more than two children get the same amount as those with two.

He also proposes a “Making Work Pay” tax credit of up to $500 per person or $1,000 per couple. This would be a rebate on the Social Security payroll tax (6.2%) paid on the first $8,100 of earnings. Like the EITC, a strength of this proposal in both policy and political terms is that it creates no work disincentive.

My preference would be for a bit smaller increase in the federal minimum wage and that the “Making Work Pay” tax credit money instead be used for an across-the-board increase in the EITC. Still, there is little indication from the historical record that a minimum-wage hike to $9.50 would reduce employment. And the “Making Work Pay” tax credit is attractive politically because it’s easier to pitch as a tax cut and because all middle-class earners will be eligible for it, whereas the EITC is available only to households with incomes up to about $40,000.

3. Paid sick leave

According to the Obama campaign, about three-quarters of low-paid private sector employees get no (zero) paid sick days from their employer. He proposes to require all employers to provide seven paid sick days per year.

4. Education

Obama proposes $10 billion in federal government spending to encourage and assist state efforts to expand early education for kids age zero to five. High-quality preschool is doubly beneficial from an antipoverty perspective: it facilitates employment by parents in low-earning households, and it tends to improve cognitive ability and noncognitive skills in kids from poor families.

A refundable (available even to those who don’t owe federal income taxes) tax credit would provide $4,000 toward college tuition, in exchange for 100 hours of public service work per year. This is about two-thirds of the average cost of tuition at a four-year public university.

There is more, including money for job placement, career pathways, transportation to work, community revitalization, and others. But the proposals I’ve highlighted would, if actually enacted in the next four (or eight) years, represent considerable progress in addressing poverty in America.

John McCain’s proposals? Well, search his campaign’s website and see what you find.

Vote Republican if You Want Equal Pay?

September 13, 2008

In a Wall Street Journal op-ed, Casey Mulligan points out that over the past half century the pay gap between women and men has shrunk more under Republican presidents than under Democratic ones. The following chart shows this. The data are from the Census Bureau.

Mulligan argues that the best way to achieve equal pay is therefore “to work for a labor market that creates opportunities for women like it did during the Reagan and the Bush years.” But as the next two charts indicate, the Republican advantage in closing the gender pay gap owes mainly to slow earnings growth for men during Republican administrations, rather than rapid earnings growth for women.

More here and here.

Nixonland: One, Two, or Many Americas?

June 17, 2008

Rick Perlstein’s Nixonland is a terrific book. It’s a fascinating history of American society and politics from 1965 to 1972, woven together in a compelling and exceptionally well-written narrative. I had such a hard time putting the book down it nearly spoiled my recent family vacation.

Nixonland aims at more than a historical recounting. Perlstein suggests that during these years Americans increasingly divided into two political groups, and these groups’ opposition to one another grew more intense and passionate. Here’s how he puts it on the book’s penultimate page (p. 747): “I have written of the rise, between the years 1965 and 1972, of a nation that had believed itself to be at consensus instead becoming one of incommensurate visions of apocalypse: two loosely defined congeries of Americans, each convinced that should the other triumph, everything decent and true and worth preserving would end.”

It’s difficult to read the book and not be at least somewhat convinced. The 1960s brought enhanced government support for economic security and opportunity via Lyndon Johnson’s “Great Society” programs, civil rights legislation that opened economic and social doors for racial minorities and women, and massive cultural liberalization among young Americans. Yet it also brought a backlash. Hence the remarkable contrast between the 1964 and 1972 presidential elections — two of the most lopsided in American history, the former yielding an activist-government Democratic president, the latter a law-and-order Republican. And stunningly, given the seemingly inexorable liberalization of the mid-to-late 1960s, Republicans have won seven of the ten presidential elections since 1964.

Perlstein is at his best in providing insight into the motivations behind the backlash: the overwhelming sense of chaos, disorder, violence, insecurity, change — urban riots by frustrated African Americans, widespread drug use, disintegration of authority on college campuses and in public spaces, the seeming impotence of the American military in a poor Asian nation, unruly protesters at the Democrats’ 1968 political convention, exploding crime rates, horrific murders in once-calm suburban neighborhoods. The changes were fast, furious, and, to many ordinary Americans, frightening.

It isn’t only the historical facts that persuade. It’s also Perlstein’s telling of them. He steps quickly from one aspect of change to another, digs deeply into a particular event, such as the Newark riots or an antiwar rally, and then jumps abruptly to another and another. The prose is vivid and punchy. Without going overboard, it conveys the feel of growing chaos.

Is Perlstein right about what happened during these years? Did America harden into two warring camps? I think an argument can be made that something very different occurred: the developments of the 1960s coupled with (and accentuated by) Nixon’s political tactics opened up new fissures that left the political landscape not more crystallized, but more clouded. Instead of shifting from (more or less) one America to two, the shift was, arguably, toward a greater multiplicity of political identities that the two political parties had to struggle mightily to try to shape into manageable coalitions.

After the New Deal, economic policy was the chief fault line between Democrats and Republicans. The political legacy of the 1960s is the diminution of one incongruous aspect of American party politics, the Democrats’ dominance in the conservative south, but simultaneously the growing importance of issues that cut across the economic divide:

Race. With the 1964 Civil Rights Act, Democrats became not only the party representing the economic interests of the lower and middle classes, but the champions of economic opportunity for black Americans — and soon of integration of neighborhoods and schools.

Cultural norms about authority, sex, drugs, appearance, and public behavior

Crime

Gender relations in the home and at work

Foreign policy

Separation of church and state

The environment

Socio-political status. One of Nixon’s chief contributions to altering the fault lines in American politics, according to Perlstein, had to do with social and political status. Nixon always felt himself an outsider. In college he formed a club, the “Orthogonians,” composed of self-perceived commoners, hard-working strivers excluded from the well-bred, elitist, condescending “Franklins.” Beginning with his 1952 “Checkers Speech,” in which he invoked his family’s humble financial circumstances and his wife’s “respectable Republican cloth [as opposed to mink] coat,” Nixon played up the seeming incongruity of rich Ivy-league-educated Democratic politicians claiming to speak and govern on behalf of working- and middle-class Americans.

It’s widely recognized that these issues increasingly fractured the Democratic coalition. But they also, if perhaps less dramatically, created new rifts among Republicans.

Despite the popularity of the “two Americas” image, recent research (such as this, this, and this) suggests that the views of Americans are not especially polarized. Was it different in 1972?

This isn’t much explored by Perlstein, in part because the second half of the book, covering the period from 1969 to 1972, focuses heavily on Nixon and Vietnam. In the book’s Preface, Perlstein writes (p. xiii) “The main character in Nixonland is not Richard Nixon. Its protagonist, in fact, has no name — but lives on every page. It is the voter who, in 1964, pulled the lever for the Democrat for president because to do anything else, at least that particular Tuesday in November, seemed to court civilizational chaos, and who, eight years later, pulled the lever for the Republican for exactly the same reason.” I think that’s accurate for the first half of the book. But in the second half the story is much more about Nixon himself than about those voters.

Throughout this latter part of the book I wanted to hear less about what Nixon was thinking and what he and Abbie Hoffman and the Weathermen were doing (though that’s plenty interesting) and more about what those voters were thinking. For instance, were they still, in 1970 and 1972, concerned about the urban riots that are front and center in Perlstein’s discussion of 1965 and 1966? His description of post-1968 developments focuses almost entirely on Vietnam and the counterculture, with very occasional and brief mentions of crime and busing. Notwithstanding the book’s considerable virtues, I finished it feeling just as uncertain as before about the political sensibilities of the “switchers” that Perlstein sees as his protagonist.

Were they, by 1972, committed Republicans? Or was their vote for Nixon largely a function of the perceived extremism and stumbling campaign of the Democratic presidential nominee? After all, as Perlstein notes, in the same 1972 election in which McGovern was pummeled, the Democrats lost only twelve seats in the House, maintaining a majority of more than fifty, and gained two in the Senate.

Were there really two Americas in 1972, or had political views and allegiances instead become, like the events of the preceding years, increasingly chaotic and confused?

Electability

March 14, 2008

Barack Obama is ahead of Hillary Clinton in the (regular) delegate count, and it looks almost certain that he will remain so when all of the primaries and caucuses are completed. Still, the gap is not large, and it is possible that Clinton will end up with the most popular votes. Rightly or wrongly, it appears that some — perhaps many — of the as-yet-uncommitted Democratic superdelegates intend to take electability into account in deciding which candidate to support (see here, here, and here).

What information should they consider in making a decision?

Partisans and pundits have suggested a number of reasons why one might stand a better chance than the other of defeating John McCain in the general election. Clinton is more strongly despised by conservatives and thus may generate larger Republican turnout. On the other hand, she appears to have stronger support among working-class voters, women, and Latinos, whereas Obama is stronger among professionals and African Americans. If the latter groups are more likely than the former to vote Democratic regardless of who is the nominee, this is an advantage for Clinton. Obama seems more likely to inspire independents, but Clinton may be better prepared to effectively confront Republican attacks. I’m not convinced that these considerations clearly favor one or the other.

National polls pitting Obama or Clinton vs. McCain are another potential source of information. They often show little difference between the two, but it’s too early for them to be of much use.

If I were a superdelegate trying to assess electability, I’d be inclined to focus on which candidate is most likely to win states that are not solidly “blue” or “red.”

The following chart shows the 24 states in which the popular vote in the 2000 and/or 2004 presidential election was within 10 percentage points. The numbers in parentheses indicate the 2000 and 2004 vote results. A plus sign means the Democratic candidate (Gore, Kerry) won the state; a minus sign means Bush won it. The states are ordered by the number of electoral votes they’ll have in the 2008 general election. The markers (“Ob” and “Cl”) indicate the winner of the state’s primary or caucus.

Consider first the 20 states at the bottom. Together they have 159 electoral votes. All but one have had their primary or caucus already. Of them, Obama has won states that have total of 98 electoral votes, and Clinton has won states with a total of 56 electoral votes. (West Virginia, with 5, holds its primary in May.) These results favor Obama.

One can argue that perhaps some of these states aren’t truly in play. New Jersey seems likely to go Democratic regardless of who is the nominee, and so too do Hawaii, Maine, and New Hampshire. Similarly, neither Obama nor Clinton is likely to win Tennessee or West Virginia. As best I can tell, though, subtracting these types of states would not change the picture much.

What could change it significantly is if all of the “big four” states — Florida, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Michigan — go for Clinton. These states have 85 electoral votes between them. They decided the 2000 and 2004 elections, and might well do so again this time. If Clinton were to win these four states, she’d have won in-play states with a total of 141 electoral votes, versus 98 for Obama. Though primary results don’t automatically translate into general election performance (see this and this), this would give her a case for claiming greater electability. Otherwise, it seems to me that electability either is a draw or favors Obama.

Clinton won Ohio. Pennsylvania holds its primary April 22nd. If I were a superdelegate concerned about electability, I would want a true primary result from Florida and Michigan.

Addendum:  Jeff Weintraub has some sensible thoughts on what the Democrats should do about Florida and Michigan.

Hibbs Model and the 2008 Election

March 13, 2008

Doug Hibbs has posted an analysis of the implications of his “bread and peace” model for the 2008 presidential election. My earlier, considerably less thorough discussion is here. See also summary and comments by Mark Thoma and Andrew Gelman.

The Left, the Right, and Income Growth

February 17, 2008

Which political party is better at improving living standards?

A commonplace view is that Democrats favor policies that boost the well-being of the poor while Republicans’ policy preferences are more conducive to economic growth and rising incomes. Debates about high vs. low taxes, generous vs. stingy social programs, and heavy vs. light regulation of business often are framed in terms of a tradeoff between compassion and growth. Should government do more to assist the poor? Or should it intervene less, thereby helping the economy to grow more rapidly?

For the most part this debate is a battle of rhetoric and assumptions. Many on the right assume that lower taxes, less regulation, and less generous social policies must be good for economic growth. Some on the left accept this assumption but argue that growth will fail to trickle down to the poor. Others dispute the assumption.

Evidence can help. There is a great deal of it that is potentially relevant. Here is one piece. Using tax records and surveys, the Congressional Budget Office has compiled good data on household incomes from 1979 through 2005 (here). The presidency was held by a Republican from 1981 to 1992, by a Democrat from 1993 to 2000, and by a Republican since 2000. The following chart shows average rates of income growth (adjusted for inflation and with taxes subtracted) for each of the five quintiles (fifths) of households during these three periods.

Income growth for each of these groups, from the poorest to the middle to the richest, has been faster during Democratic administrations than Republican ones.

Does this prove that Democrats are more effective than Republicans at promoting income growth? No. A government’s ability to affect income growth is limited, Democrats controlled one or both houses of Congress during Republican presidencies and vice-versa, and each of these periods has idiosyncratic features (see here, here, and here, for instance). Still, the data offer reason for skepticism about the notion that policies favored by the right are better at raising living standards.

Nor is this peculiar to the American context. Here is a counterpart chart showing income growth in the United Kingdom over the same period. The Conservative party held the government from 1979 to 1997; the Labour party has held it since. The data are from the Institute for Fiscal Studies (here).

Incomes of the richest fifth increased slightly more rapidly during the years of Conservative government, but most British households have fared as well or better under (New) Labour.

Bread, Peace, and the 2008 Election

February 3, 2008

Douglas Hibbs’ “bread and peace” model has been extremely effective at predicting the outcomes of U.S. presidential elections. This chart, covering elections from 1952 to 2004, gives you the gist:

On the vertical axis is the incumbent-party candidate’s share of the two-party vote. On the horizontal axis is the growth rate of per capita real disposable personal income (DPI) over the three and a half years leading up to the election. The growth rate is adjusted so that more recent periods (quarters) are weighted more heavily. Income growth — “bread” — is a strikingly good predictor of the vote outcome.

There are two main exceptions: 1952 and 1968. (These aren’t included in calculating the regression line in the chart.) This is where the “peace” component of the model comes in. In those two years the incumbent (Democratic) party suffered from a large number of American casualties in a war for which it was viewed as responsible — Korea in 1952 and Vietnam in 1968. Those two wars were still relevant in the ensuing elections, in 1956 and 1972, but the incumbent (Republican) party didn’t suffer much because it hadn’t started the wars.

In analyses in a 2000 article and a recent update (here; hat tip to Andrew Gelman), Hibbs finds that other factors neither add to the explanatory utility of the bread and peace model nor reduce the estimated impact of income growth and war casualties.

What does the model predict for the 2008 election? It’s early yet, but nevertheless interesting to take a look. Through the end of 2007, Hibbs’ weighted income growth rate measure is 1.4% (my calculation). If that continues and “bread” dominates, as it has in most prior elections, the model projects a victory for the Republican candidate. The next chart shows this as “2008a.”

Surprised? Many citizens and pundits expect a Democratic victory. And seemingly with good reason. The current Republican president is extremely unpopular, the Democrats did very well in the 2006 mid-term elections, Democratic voters appear to be more energized than their Republican counterparts, and the two issues voters say are most important to them, the economy and the Iraq war, seem likely to favor the Democratic candidate. Still, some recent polls (such as this and this and this) suggest a Republican nominee might well defeat either Hillary Clinton or Barack Obama in the general election.

Lots of things could result in a Democrat winning in November. In the context of the Hibbs model there are three relevant scenarios.

  1. The 2008 election is an exception. In politics there are no immutable laws. Even if average income growth and war casualties have been and continue to be key factors in presidential elections, they might not determine the outcome of this one.
  2. Like in 1952 and 1968, the incumbent party is hurt by American casualties in a war it initiated. As a result, its candidate receives less than 50% of the two-party vote despite relatively rapid income growth. This is shown in the chart as “2008b.” Hibbs reports that approximately 29,000 Americans had been killed in Korea at the time of the 1952 election, and almost exactly the same number had died in Vietnam by November of 1968. As of February 2008 nearly 4,000 Americans have been killed in the Iraq war. That’s far fewer than in 1952 or 1968, but the public’s tolerance threshold may be considerably lower now (see here, for instance).
  3. Income growth slows in 2008. That would reduce the predicted vote share of the incumbent-party (Republican) candidate, especially since growth in recent periods is weighted more heavily in the model. This is shown as “2008c” in the chart. At the moment, with the economy teetering on the brink of recession, a slowing of income growth appears extremely likely.

Another possibility is that the model no longer works well. You can see in the first chart above that 1996 and 2000 are not predicted very well by income growth, and unlike 1952 and 1968 they cannot be explained by war casualties. The model predicts 2004 accurately, but perhaps that is a fluke, due to fear of terrorism and the incumbent president’s at-that-time seemingly successful prosecution of the Afghanistan and Iraq wars.

Why might the model no longer work well? One hypothesis is that as a society gets richer, pocketbook issues recede in importance for voters.

A second consideration is that growth of per capita personal income is no longer a useful indicator of how voters have fared economically. In recent decades the bulk of income gains have gone to a small slice of the population — those at the top of the distribution. Measuring growth via an average misses this. The next chart illustrates the point. From the late 1940s through the mid-1970s per capita (i.e., average) DPI and median family income both increased steadily. Since the mid-seventies per capita income has continued to do so, but median family income has been relatively flat.

If the model’s effectiveness has indeed declined, other factors may matter more in 2008 than they have in the past. Which factors? And with what outcome? Your guess is probably as good as mine.

Clinton, Edwards, and Obama on How to Reduce Poverty

January 16, 2008

The Center for the Study of Poverty and Inequality at Stanford University has begun publication of Pathways: A Magazine on Poverty, Inequality, and Social Policy. The full contents are available here. The inaugural issue includes, among other interesting articles, brief but substantive statements by Hillary Clinton, John Edwards, and Barack Obama on their proposed strategies for reducing poverty.

Particularly helpful is a piece by Rebecca Blank assessing the three candidates’ proposals. Blank is one of the country’s most careful and sensible analysts of poverty and social policy. Her conclusion:

“Obama, Edwards, and Clinton all have multifaceted and serious anti-poverty plans. Anyone concerned with poverty issues could happily vote for any of them. Edwards has made poverty a centerpiece issue for his campaign from the beginning; Clinton has the best early childhood proposals; Obama is the most thoughtful on jobs for disadvantaged youth and urban change and (for my money) the most creative in putting new policy ideas on the table, such as low-cost Internet service in poor neighborhoods.”

She also emphasizes that while each of the three favors multiple worthy policies,

“it is hard to tell how they would prioritize their current list of proposals. Presidents face limited resources and hard choices once they actually enter the White House and have to decide where to place their political chips.”

Read the full piece to see Blank’s own priority list.

How the Democrats Lost Their Class

December 17, 2007

The notion that the Democrats’ electoral troubles since the 1960s are mainly a function of southern whites turning Republican is quickly becoming conventional wisdom. Thomas Schaller offers a version of this story in his book Whistling Past Dixie. In an article titled “What’s the Matter with What’s the Matter with Kansas?“, Larry Bartels concludes that the entire Democrat-to-Republican shift in presidential voting among working-class whites occurred in the south. Paul Krugman embraces Bartels’ findings in The Conscience of a Liberal. Here’s how Krugman puts it:

“The overwhelming importance of the Southern switch suggests an almost embarrassingly simple story about the political success of movement conservatism. It goes like this: Thanks to their organization … movement conservatives were able to take over the Republican party, and move its policies sharply to the right. In most of the country this rightward shift alienated voters, who gradually moved toward the Democrats. But Republicans were nevertheless able to win presidential elections, and eventually gain control of Congress, because they were able to exploit the race issue to win political dominance of the South.” (p. 182)

This view of developments contains an important truth: Southern whites were heavily Democratic until the mid-sixties. Now they are less so, and today the south is the easily the most Republican region of the country.

Yet the notion that the defection of whites, especially working-class whites, from the Democrats has been largely confined to the south paints too simple a portrait. Since 1972 the General Social Survey has asked American adults about their “party identification,” along with a battery of other questions. People’s political preferences ultimately matter to the extent they influence actual voting choices. But analyzing presidential voting alone, as Bartels does, can miss part of the story. Presidential voting is heavily influenced by the particular candidates the two parties nominate. Arguably, people’s underlying preferences and beliefs are better understood by looking at their party identification. The following chart shows the share of working-class whites identifying as strong-Democrat, moderately-strong-Democrat, or independent-leaning-Democrat since the early 1970s.

The country is split here into three regions: the south, the midwest and plains states, and the east and west coasts. In the south, identification with the Democrats fell roughly 20 percentage points — from 60% to 40% — between the mid-1970s and the early 1990s and has held steady since then. This is consistent with the picture offered by Bartels and Krugman.

Yet the same thing happened in the other two regions — even on the coasts, where the most solidly “blue” states are located.

With several graduate students at the University of Arizona, I have been examining this development (“The Democrats and Working-Class Whites”). It turns out not to be a function of our measure of party identification or of the working class. Nor is it specific to men or to the most religious. And most of those who left the Democrats didn’t become “independents.” In fact, since the early 1990s approximately 40% of working-class whites have identified as Republican — the same as the share that identifies as Democrat.

What caused this development? We conclude that it was due in large part to the crisis of the late 1970s. The economy fell apart under a Democratic president and Democrat-controlled Congress, leading many in the working class to question whether the party was still the better of the two at securing their material well-being. Ronald Reagan offered a simple and seemingly plausible solution — less government — which also tapped into desire for tax relief. The Democrats’ economic woes were compounded by the twin foreign policy disasters of 1979 (the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Iranian hostage crisis), rising crime, forced busing, and affirmative action.

The deep recession of the early 1980s brought a temporary halt to the white working-class defection. But as the economy recovered in the mid-to-late eighties, as Reagan’s actual policy shifts proved less radical than his rhetoric, and as the Soviet bloc crumbled beginning in 1989, the defection resumed.

As the chart above reveals, little has changed since the early 1990s. This is puzzling. After all, Republican presidents presided over the two most recent economic recessions (early 1990s and early 2000s), and far and away the healthiest economic period for workers in the past generation was the Clinton years of the late nineties. We find, consistent with Thomas Frank’s What’s the Matter with Kansas? argument, that this is due partly to heightened importance of social issues such as homosexuality and abortion to working-class whites. Another key factor is that the cohort of working-class whites who turned 20 since the mid-1970s, when the defection from the Democrats began, has always been less pro-Democrat. They have been gradually replacing the much more pro-Democrat cohort that came of age during the Roosevelt and Truman years.

This does not mean Democrats don’t, or won’t, win elections. They still get the votes of many working-class whites. And as John Judis and Ruy Teixeira ably document in The Emerging Democratic Majority, they now tend to win a sizable majority of the votes of urban professionals, as well as African Americans, Latinos, and women.

But regaining the consistent support of a majority of working-class whites would certainly help. Depending on the definition, this group constitutes roughly a third to half of the voting-age population.

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