How should we measure the poverty rate?

August 14, 2011

Perhaps we shouldn’t.

The idea behind a poverty rate is that we set an income line below which people’s resources are deemed insufficient for a minimally decent standard of living. The poverty rate is the share of people in households with income below that line.

Because it’s a binary measure, it’s a crude one. Suppose a lot of the poor at time 1 have incomes just below the poverty line. The economy then improves, or the benefit amount for a government transfer program is increased, so at time 2 a number of those people have moved above the line. It will appear that poverty has been sharply reduced, even though the amount of genuine progress is small. Similarly, suppose a number of people who formerly had very low incomes move into the work force and experience an income rise, but that rise doesn’t quite get them above the poverty line. This is a significant improvement, but it won’t show up at all in the poverty rate.

This problem is well known among social scientists. Some therefore also calculate the “poverty gap” — the distance between the poverty line and the average income of those below the line. To that we can add inequality among the poor. Measures exist to incorporate either or both of these. But they are complicated and thus difficult to communicate to a nontechnical audience. One common measure, for instance, is the poverty rate multiplied by the poverty gap. This is better than the poverty rate by itself, but the numbers yielded by the measure don’t have an intuitive feel.

Another problem with poverty rates is that much hinges on where the line is drawn, so we end up mired in interminable debates about exactly where that should be (here, here).

Is there a useful alternative? I think so.

Instead of a relative poverty rate, such as the official measure used by the European Union, I recommend the p50/p10 income ratio. Relative poverty is essentially a measure of inequality within the lower half of the distribution, so why not use a measure that more clearly conveys that? The 50/10 ratio is an inequality measure already familiar to social scientists, and it’s fairly simple to explain and understand. And as the first of the following two charts shows, the 50/10 ratio is very similar to the poverty rate multiplied by the poverty gap (the correlation is .96). The second chart shows that the poverty rate is a less effective proxy for the rate x gap.

Instead of an absolute poverty rate, such as the official poverty measure in the United States, we can use absolute household income at the tenth percentile (p10) of the distribution. Across countries and over time, this measure is very similar to the absolute poverty rate multiplied by the absolute poverty gap. But it’s much simpler and easier to comprehend. Also, it’s a low-end analogue to median (p50) household income, a common indicator of the living standards of the middle class.

Why the tenth percentile rather than the fifth or the fifteenth? Actually, I’d prefer the fifth, but there sometimes is reason to worry about data quality as we get close to the very bottom of the distribution. The tenth is reasonably close but not too close to the bottom, it’s a nice round number, and it already is commonly used in inequality measures such as the 50/10 ratio and the 90/10 ratio. But in truth, the choice of the tenth is arbitrary; it’s no more representative than the seventh or the twelfth or any other point at the low end of the distribution.

So we have good alternatives to the two most common poverty rate measures. But what about political impact? Isn’t the poverty rate a helpful tool in pressing policy makers to keep their eye on the least well-off? Maybe. Yet hardly any of Europe’s rich nations had an official poverty rate measure prior to the EU’s introduction of one a decade ago, while here in the U.S. we’ve had an official poverty rate for nearly half a century. The absence of an official poverty rate doesn’t seem to have impeded government commitment to the poor in Europe. And I’m not sure the presence of one has helped a whole lot here.

I don’t expect policy makers or social scientists to stop using poverty rates any time soon. And it won’t be disastrous if they don’t. But we could do better.


Living standards in the U.K.

July 28, 2011

Three very helpful reports on living standards in the United Kingdom:

James Plunkett, Growth without gain? The faltering living standards of people on low-to-middle incomes

Matthew Whittaker and Lee Savage, Missing out: why ordinary workers are experiencing growth without gain

Wenchao Jin, Robert Joyce, David Phillips, and Luke Sibieta, Poverty and inequality in the UK: 2011

To keep up with U.K. developments, I typically look to:

Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion

Centre for Economic Performance

Institute for Fiscal Studies

Institute for Public Policy Research

Joseph Rowntree Foundation

Policy Network

Resolution Foundation


Is there a viable progressive politics that doesn’t hinge on a strong labor movement?

July 20, 2011

That’s the crux of the issue in the “technocratic, neoliberal leftism” discussion by Henry Farrell, Matthew Yglesias, Kevin Drum, Brad DeLong, Noah Millman, and others.

Here’s what we know from the experiences of the world’s rich democracies: Relative to other nations, those in which labor is highly organized are more likely to have an influential social democratic and/or Catholic center-right (emphasis on center) political party, a proportional representation electoral system, well-organized employers, formal or informal-but-institutionalized participation by labor and business associations in the policy-making process, generous social insurance programs and complementary programs to help households that fall between the social insurance cracks, expansive public services, similar long-run economic growth, a fairly egalitarian distribution of individual wages and household incomes, reliable economic security, extensive economic mobility, and generous holiday and vacation time.

Sorting out the causality is a bit tricky, but it seems probable that labor organization has contributed to most, if not all, of these outcomes. If you want progressive policies, the comparative historical evidence suggests it’s very helpful to have a strong labor movement. Indeed, after democracy, it might well be the single most valuable thing to have.

But what if you live in a country with labor unions that are weak, and getting weaker? What if your country is the United States?

You might choose to focus on strengthening the union movement. Or you might seek an alternative view (“theory of politics”) about conditions for feasible and sustainable progressive policy change. Is there any such view? I think so.

Forge whatever electoral coalition you can, including but not necessarily centered on unions. Organize sympathetic interest groups into single- or multi-issue movements and coalitions. Build up a network of think tanks, journalists, bloggers, and other organizations and individuals to identify and expose the strategies and plans of opposing forces. Offer worthy, workable policy ideas and try to get them (or some acceptable version of them) passed when possible. Aim for big policy advances in rare favorable moments and small ones the rest of the time. (Examples of big ones in American social policy: universal public K-12 schooling, Social Security, unemployment insurance, AFDC, minimum wage, Medicare, Medicaid, Food Stamps, Affordable Care Act. Examples of smaller ones: Head Start, indexing of Social Security benefits to inflation, EITC (it later got big), expansion of EITC and indexing it to inflation, child tax credit, S-CHIP, periodic minimum wage increases.) If your favored programs work well, people will like them. They’ll therefore be difficult — not impossible, but difficult — for the other side to weaken or remove when it’s in power. This last element of the strategy, avoiding policy reversals, is critical, and it’s aided by the array of veto points in the American policy-making process (though there’s also this).

This is a second-best strategy, to be sure. But in the American context it may be the only practicable one.

Nor is its relevance confined to the United States. Workers are relatively unorganized in some other affluent nations, such as Japan and New Zealand. Even in western Europe, the bastion of encompassing labor movements, its relevance is likely to grow. One reason is the American problem: unionization is declining in much of Europe too, though from a higher level and at a slower pace than here. A second reason is the “postmaterialism” problem: union members may grow less and less wedded to left parties and progressive policies.

Henry Farrell suggests that we “not only need to think about the abstract desirability of a policy, but whether it supports or undermines the coalition that makes this and other desirable policies possible.” I agree. But I’d discourage any sort of rigidity on this. Sometimes good policy might usefully be subordinated to long-run politics, and sometimes not.


America’s inefficient health-care system: another look

July 10, 2011

America’s health-care system differs from its counterparts in other affluent nations in a number of ways: greater fragmentation among payers and price-setters, stronger incentives for overuse of advanced diagnostic and treatment technology, higher administrative costs, less access to care for some. We might therefore expect it to perform less efficiently — to achieve poorer health outcomes for a given amount of expenditure (see here, here, here).

The following chart is sometimes viewed as evidence in favor of this hypothesis. The chart plots life expectancy at birth by per capita health expenditures as of 2007. Twenty affluent nations are included. Among these countries the U.S. spends by far the most money on health care and yet has the lowest life expectancy.

The inference is problematic, however, because America differs from the other countries in a number of ways that may affect health outcomes. It has a higher murder rate. It has more obesity. The U.S. population is more spatially dispersed than those of most other countries, so rural residents may live farther away from medical providers. Given these and other differences, how confident can we be that health spending is less effective in the U.S. than elsewhere?

Here’s a better way to compare. This chart shows trends in life expectancy by trends in health spending from 1970 to 2008.

The United States still stands out, and in a big way. Our gain in life expectancy per additional health spending is much smaller than in other countries, particularly after the early 1980s when we reached expenditures of about $2,500 per person (in 2005 dollars) and life expectancy of around 74-75 years.

The advantage of analyzing country differences in change is that it takes constant nation-specific factors out of play. It’s not a foolproof analytical strategy, but it reduces the likelihood of mistakenly inferring causation from correlation.

What we need to be wary of is life expectancy depressors that may have increased more or decreased less in the U.S. than in the other countries. Are there any? Not smoking: our rate of decline is in the middle of the pack. Not homicide: it’s decreased more here than elsewhere. Probably not spatial dispersion: Americans began moving back into cities in recent decades. One possibility, though, is obesity. Not only is it more prevalent here; it’s also increased more.

This kind of analysis is by no means conclusive. Life expectancy and total spending are highly aggregated indicators; it’s important to also examine more fine-grained measures of health-care effort and outcomes (see here, here, here).  But to the extent we treat the aggregate patterns as informative, a comparison of changes over time, rather than of levels, is likely to be our most valuable guide.

Update: Second chart now corrected, thanks to commenter Roger Chittum.


Are Barcelona the best soccer team ever?

July 3, 2011

I say yes.

I’m referring to the Barcelona team of the past three seasons, 2009-11. Despite a few nontrivial player changes — Samuel Eto’o replaced by Zlatan Ibrahimovic in 2010 and then by David Villa in 2011, Thierry Henry replaced by Pedro Rodriguez, Yaya Toure replaced by Sergio Busquets — the squad remained largely intact over this period.

Who are their chief rivals? And on what grounds can we consider Barça superior?

National teams

Nearly everyone who isn’t a diehard partisan views Brazil’s 1970 squad the best national team ever. A recent poll of experts yielded this conclusion, with Brazil 1970 followed by the mid-1950s Hungarian national team and the Netherlands’ 1974 World Cup team. The 1970 Brazilian team featured Pelé, the widely-acknowledged best player of all time, along with several other entertaining attacking talents like Jairzinho, Tostão, and Roberto Rivelino. It played with a seldom-replicated panache and soundly defeated most of its opponents.

In a head-to-head match, the contemporary Barça team would demolish the 1970 Brazilians; fitness, strength, skill, and tactics have advanced a good bit in the past four decades. The only fair way to compare across such a long stretch of time is by assessing the teams relative to others in their own era.

I give the edge to Barça for three reasons.

First, Brazil were pretty equally matched by England in the 1970 World Cup. The two teams met in the first round. Brazil ended up winning 1-0, but it easily could have gone the other way. England played Brazil straight up and gave as much as they got.

To my knowledge, in the past three years no competitor has played Barcelona straight up and succeeded in giving them a genuine challenge. Manchester United tried in the 2009 and 2011 Champions League finals. In both matches they did well for the first ten minutes, but after that Barcelona thoroughly dominated. Real Madrid, perhaps the second best team in the world this year, tried to play Barça straight up in a league match this past fall. Barcelona won 5-0.

Barcelona are so good — so capable of keeping the ball for long stretches, creating scoring opportunities, and getting the ball back quickly when they lose it — that even the most talented attacking teams tend to feel no choice but to retreat into a defensive shell against them. The strategy is to “park the bus,” pulling most players back into the defensive third of the field, and hope for a counterattack goal or two. Three of the best attacking teams in recent memory — Chelsea in the 2009 Champions League semifinals, Arsenal in 2010 and 2011 Champions League ties, and Real Madrid in this year’s Champions League semifinals — were reduced to this approach.

Is this because these next-best teams simply aren’t very strong? On the contrary. In today’s soccer the top club teams are better than the top national teams. Globalization and the absence of a salary cap have allowed the world’s richest clubs to concentrate talent from around the world in a way that national teams can’t. This year’s Real Madrid team is one of the best we’ve seen in years. It features some of the top attacking players on the planet. Against Barcelona in the Champions League, however, Real’s coach Jose Mourinho kept several of them on the bench and played with, in effect, seven defenders. In the end it didn’t work, but it probably was their best hope of winning.

My second reason for preferring Barcelona 2009-11 over Brazil 1970 is the Brazilian team’s dodgy goalkeeper. It was a major liability. Barça has no comparable weakness.

Third, Spain won last year’s World Cup in what I think was the most dominant performance since Brazil’s in 1970. They took the game to every team they faced and won the tournament convincingly, even though a number of their victories were by small margins. Barcelona’s club team is essentially that Spanish national team plus Lionel Messi, the world’s best player and one of the ten best of all time. It’s a bit like taking Brazil’s 1970 team and adding Johan Cruyff or Franz Beckenbauer (or perhaps Gordon Banks in goal).

Club teams

Are there club teams that might rival Barcelona 2009-11 for the title of greatest team ever? One obvious candidate is Real Madrid 1956-60. Their record of five consecutive European Cup (the predecessor of the Champions League) titles likely will never be equaled. The team featured two of the premier players of the 1950s in Ferenc Puskas and Alfredo di Stefano. But that was an utterly different soccer era, before teams knew how to defend. And I’m skeptical about the quality of the competition they faced. Rightly or wrongly, I exclude them from consideration.

Here are four others.

Ajax 1971-73. This team won three consecutive European Cup titles and dominated the Dutch league until Johan Cruyff left to play for Barcelona. It also included the nucleus of the great 1974 Dutch World Cup team. But herein lies a problem. Most would consider the 1974 Netherlands team better than the Ajax team, and most also rank Netherlands 1974 below Brazil 1970.

Bayern Munich 1972-76. Bayern dominated the German Bundesliga in the early 1970s and won three successive European Cup titles following Ajax’ run. It then dropped off when Franz Beckenbauer left for the New York Cosmos in 1976. Here too, though, we have a club team-national team difficulty. The Bayern team contained the nucleus of the World Cup-winning German national team in 1974. But that World Cup squad probably was better than Bayern, and the World Cup squad is generally rated below the team they beat, the Netherlands, which in turn is ranked below Brazil 1970.

Liverpool 1977-84. Liverpool won four European Cup titles in eight years, including three in five years. They also won six English league titles during those eight years.  There was a good bit of turnover during this span — the key forward, for instance, shifted from Kevin Keegan in 1977 to Kenny Dalglish for the bulk of the period to Ian Rush by the end — so it’s a stretch to think of this as a single team. I suspect that’s why relatively few seem to include them on the list of top contenders for all-time greatest status.

AC Milan 1989-91. This was a mesmerizing squad, with Paolo Maldini and several other Italian stalwarts alongside the brilliant Dutch trio of Marco van Basten, Ruud Gullit, and Frank Rijkaard. The team won the European Cup in 1989 and 1990 and went through the entire 1992 Italian league (Serie A) season undefeated.

Great teams dominate their competition. There’s a qualitative aspect to dominance, but we can also look at the numbers. I think the two key indicators are titles and goal difference.

Begin with titles. Barcelona has now won the Champions League two of the past three years. (It’s won three of the past six, but the squad that won in 2006 was sufficiently different that I’m not including it here.) This isn’t the best title run ever. But it’s no less impressive than the earlier runs by Ajax, Bayern, Liverpool, and AC Milan. Virtually all of the world’s best players now play in Europe, with many of them concentrated in just ten clubs. Barcelona therefore faces stronger competition than its predecessors.

Barça has won its domestic league (La Liga) each of the past three years. The Spanish league is less competitive than the English Premier League, but it’s quite good. And in the past two years Barça’s main domestic rival, Real Madrid, has been one of the world’s top two or three teams.

Including titles in the assessment diminishes the luster of the AC Milan team of 1989-93 somewhat. Though it won the European Cup twice in a row, Milan won the Italian league title only twice during that five-year span.

Along with titles, goal difference (goals scored minus goals allowed) is probably the best quantitative indicator of dominance. The following chart shows per-game goal difference for each of these five club teams in domestic league matches and in Champions League matches. Performance in Champions League matches is the better measure for comparison, since domestic league quality varies a good bit. Ajax stands above the other four in goal difference in domestic matches, but the Dutch league competition was likely the weakest of the five.

Barcelona looks good relative to the others in both Champions League and domestic league goal difference. Is its impressive Champions League goal difference a product of some early-round 10-0 thrashings of weak opponents? No; Barça’s largest margin in any Champions League match during its three-year run was five goals.

Lucky rather than great?

One possible knock on Barcelona is that they got a bit lucky in their Champions League seminal tie in both 2009 and 2011. In 2009 they faced Chelsea. In the first leg, in Barcelona, Chelsea parked the bus and got a 0-0 draw. In the second leg Chelsea again played counterattack, and it worked well. They generated several good scoring chances, including a couple of possible penalty kicks that the referee didn’t award. Barcelona got a very late goal to tie the match 1-1 and go through to the finals on away goals. In this year’s semifinal Barça beat Real Madrid 2-0 in the first match and drew 1-1 in the second. In the first match, several Barça players reacted theatrically to some Madrid fouls, which may have contributed to Madrid’s Pepe getting red carded early in the second half. That probably helped Barcelona, though I’m not sure Real would have stopped Messi’s second goal even with eleven (or twelve or thirteen) men.

The thing is, every successful team needs a bit of luck to get by. Brazil’s 1970 World Cup team were lucky not to have to face England in the final. In the quarterfinal match between England and West Germany, England went up 2-0. England’s coach substituted for two of the team’s best players, to rest them and safeguard against injury. The Germans pulled off a remarkable comeback to win 3-2 and England were out of the tournament. In AC Milan’s first victorious European Cup run, in 1989, they faced Red Star Belgrade in a second-round home-and-away contest. They tied in the home match in Milan and were behind 1-0 in the 65th minute of the away match when a fog rolled in, forcing cancellation of the match. The full game was replayed the next day. It ended in a draw, with Milan then winning in penalty kicks.

Over time we forget the luck and remember the brilliance. A decade from now hardly anyone will remember these details of Barcelona’s Champions League triumphs. What people will recall, rightly, is Barça’s exquisite play.

A thing to behold

Are Barça the best team of all time? There’s no way to settle the question objectively, and in the end it doesn’t much matter. What matters is the joy of watching them play. I was too young to appreciate Brazil’s 1970 squad and Cruyff’s Ajax team, and television coverage then was too limited in any case. What good fortune to live at a moment when it’s been possible to see a team as glorious as this Barcelona side work its magic on a regular basis.


Can the American economy produce more decent jobs?

June 28, 2011

That’s the topic of a New America Foundation forum, with contributions by Robert Atkinson, Josh Bivens and Heidi Shierholz, Heather Boushey, James Galbraith, Joel Kotkin, Thomas Kochan, Katherine Newman, Paul Osterman, and yours truly.

Mine is titled “Low-wage jobs and no wage growth: Is there a way out?”


Replication and reanalysis, lack of incentive for

June 27, 2011

The problem is especially pronounced in the social sciences. I’d guesstimate perhaps 2% of the pages in the leading economics, policy, political science, and sociology journals feature replication and/or reanalysis. We ought to aim for something in the neighborhood of 33%.

Why the continued preference for new theory and analysis? My guess is simple path dependence. Until recently data were relatively scarce. Replication and reanalysis was no less valuable than today, but it was more difficult, time-consuming, and expensive. That’s changed profoundly. Yet the norm at most journals hasn’t. It should.

Where the journals go, tenure committees will follow.

Then again, perhaps the shift can happen without the journals.


What’s the signal that we may be headed for a “lost decade”?

June 21, 2011

“After a recession, this economy usually gets people back to work quickly. Not this time.” That’s Clive Crook in a recent FT column.

Actually, the lack of employment recovery since the official end of the great recession looks quite similar to what happened in the early 1990s and early 2000s (more data here, here, here).

If the degree of employment recovery is our signal, at this point we might indeed forecast a lost business cycle (“decade”), as in the 2000s, with the employment rate never even reaching its previous peak. But we might just as reasonably hope for a very healthy upturn, as in the 1990s.

We should be worried not just because employment growth so far has been sluggish, but also because:

1. This recession was much more severe than the previous two. We have a good bit more ground to make up.

2. Output may recover more slowly than in the past. Heavy household debt and the collapse of home values are likely to hamper consumption growth, and the Fed and Congress seem unwilling to further stimulate the economy.

3. The pattern of the 2000-07 business cycle may indicate a fundamental shift in employer practices, with greater reluctance to hire and eagerness to fire.

Update: More here from Josh Bivens and Isaac Shapiro at the Economic Policy Institute.


Relative poverty rates can mislead

June 19, 2011

Many researchers and policy makers favor a “relative” measure of poverty. That’s because our notion of what constitutes a minimally acceptable standard of living tends to be shaped by what’s typical in our own society. This approach dates back at least to Adam Smith. Its contemporary popularity owes much to Peter Townsend and Amartya Sen, and to the fact that the European Union’s official poverty measure is a relative one.

A relative poverty measure is essentially a measure of inequality within the bottom half of the income distribution. As long as this is made clear, such a measure can serve a purpose. But it’s fairly common for commentators to refer to a relative poverty rate as though it’s an indicator of absolute well-being. A journalist or opinion writer or researcher may say something like “We’ve failed to make things better for the poor; the poverty rate is the same now as a decade ago.” When hearing this, some (many?) of us will assume it reflects stagnant incomes for households at the bottom. But low-end incomes may actually have increased; that can happen without yielding any reduction in the relative poverty rate if incomes in the middle rise too.

Consider the experiences of six rich nations from the late 1970s to the mid-2000s. The following charts show trends in relative poverty and in absolute inflation-adjusted household income at the tenth percentile (a good proxy for “the poor”) in three of the six: the United States, Canada, and Germany. In each of these three countries the relative poverty rate increased slightly over the period. And in each of them absolute incomes of low-end households were flat or increased only minimally. Relative poverty rates and absolute incomes tell a consistent tale.

The story is quite different in Sweden, Norway, and Ireland. Here too relative poverty rates were flat or slightly rising. But in these three countries the absolute incomes of low-end households increased by a substantial amount. The reason the relative poverty rate in these countries didn’t fall is that household incomes at the median increased just as rapidly.

Relative poverty is of some interest, to be sure. But to avoid confusion, we might do well to sometimes refer to it as “lower-half inequality.”


Capitalism: varieties and commonalities, past and present

June 15, 2011

A review and dissection by Wolfgang Streeck. Well worth reading.


Reducing relative poverty

June 5, 2011

Reducing poverty is widely viewed as a key objective of a good society. The U.K.’s Labour government set a formal poverty reduction target in the late 1990s, and the European Union recently did so as well. In the United States, public opinion surveys consistently find a solid majority saying government spends too little money on assistance to the poor.

The standard poverty measure in comparisons of rich nations is a “relative” one. The poverty line for each country is set at a percentage, usually 60% or 50%, of that country’s median household income.

Which countries have been most successful in reducing relative poverty in recent decades? And how have they done it? Here’s what the picture looks like for twenty affluent nontiny longstanding democracies. The data are from three sources: the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS), considered the most reliable for comparative purposes; the European Union’s Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU SILC), which covers recent years for EU countries; and the OECD.

As it turns out, there is hardly any success to explain. In almost every one of these nations the relative poverty rate was no lower in 2007, the peak year of the pre-crash business cycle, than at the end of the 1970s. The only clear exception is Ireland. Denmark also reduced poverty according to the LIS data, but the OECD data suggest little or no change. Portugal is another possibility. A few countries succeeded in reducing relative poverty during certain portions of this period, such as the U.K. in the early 2000s.

What accounts for this near-universal failure?

A relative measure of poverty is essentially a measure of inequality in the lower half of the income distribution. A nation’s relative poverty rate is determined largely by three things: wage inequality among individuals in the bottom half of the distribution, employment inequality among households in the bottom half, and the generosity of the public safety net. The wage distribution has become more unequal in many countries, though by no means all. This owes to a host of developments, including globalization, deregulation of product and labor markets, manufacturing decline, weakening of collective bargaining, and increased immigration of people with language barriers and/or limited job skills. The trend in employment likewise has tended to be inegalitarian, depending on the magnitude and character of the rise in single-adult households, the movement of women into jobs, and government efforts to promote employment. Government transfers have increased in a number of countries, but often only enough to offset the rise in market inequality. And in a few nations transfers have stagnated or decreased. (More discussion here, here, here, here, and here.)

I prefer a focus on absolute incomes and living standards rather than on relative poverty, and that approach yields a very different conclusion about progress in recent decades. Still, the widespread failure of rich countries to make any headway in reducing relative poverty rates is striking.


Is heavy taxation bad for the economy?

May 22, 2011

Taxes reduce the payoff to entrepreneurship, investment, and work effort. If taxation is too heavy, these disincentives will weaken a nation’s economy. But at what point does the harmful impact kick in? And how large is it?

A puzzle

Half a century ago, in 1960, taxes totaled about a quarter of GDP in Denmark, Sweden, and the United States. The tax take then began to rise in Denmark and Sweden, reaching half of GDP by the mid-1980s, where it has remained. In America it has barely budged, hovering between 25% and 30% of GDP throughout the past five decades.

Has heavy taxation hurt the Danish and Swedish economies? If so, how much?

Begin with GDP per capita. America’s is higher than Denmark’s or Sweden’s. But that’s a legacy of the distant past. Growth of per capita GDP in the three countries has been virtually identical, both in the five decades since 1960 when the divergence in tax levels began and in the three decades since the 1970s (shown in the chart) when the tax difference has been most pronounced.

(Here and throughout I use 2007, the peak year of the pre-crash business cycle, as the end point. Adding the crash and its aftermath would improve the standing of Denmark and Sweden relative to the U.S.)

Each year since 2001 the World Economic Forum has scored most of the world’s countries on a “competitiveness” index. The index aims to assess the quality of twelve components of a nation’s economy: institutions, infrastructure, macroeconomic stability, health and primary education, higher education and training, goods market efficiency, labor market efficiency, financial market sophistication, technological readiness, market size, business sophistication, and innovation. In 2007 Denmark and Sweden were judged to be nearly identical to the United States in competitiveness. That was true throughout the decade. It also was true for the “innovation” components of the index in particular.

Employment, measured as average hours of paid work per working-age person, is a little lower in Denmark and Sweden (more here ). A larger share of working-age Danes and Swedes are employed — around 76%, compared to 72% in the U.S. But employed Danes and Swedes tend to work fewer hours than employed Americans — about 1,600 per year versus 1,800. This is due in large part to the fact that Danes and Swedes have more than five weeks of legally-mandated paid vacations and holidays, whereas Americans have none. This gap, in turn, is a function of historical differences in the strength of unions.

Employment hours increased between 1979 and 2007 in all three countries. The rate of growth was fastest in Denmark, followed by the U.S. and then Sweden.

Household income (after taxes and transfers) is higher in the United States at the ninetieth percentile (p90) of the distribution and at the median (p50). This owes to differences in per capita GDP, in income inequality, and in the degree to which citizens receive their income in the form of (tax-financed) public services. Here too the U.S. has not gained ground in recent decades. Household incomes in the middle of the distribution have grown more rapidly in Denmark and Sweden than in the U.S. (shown in the chart), and at the ninetieth percentile they’ve increased at about the same pace.

At the tenth percentile (p10), incomes are higher in Denmark and Sweden. And they’ve increased more. (See here and here.)

Denmark and Sweden have done better than the United States at keeping government debt in check.

Have high taxes required a sacrifice of liberty? Not according to the Freedom House measure of civil liberties or the Heritage Foundation-Wall St. Journal measure of economic freedom.

Finally, consider two social indicators of well-being: life expectancy and life satisfaction. On both counts, Danes and Swedes fare, on average, just as well as or better than their American counterparts.

If heavy taxation has harmful economic effects, why have Denmark and Sweden performed similarly to the United States during a period of several decades in which their taxes were much higher than America’s?

Three explanations that sidestep the puzzle

One common explanation is that small size facilitates administrative efficiency. The Danish and Swedish governments can function effectively because their scale is manageable. They are “big” governments, but in small countries. This might be true, but to say that heavy taxation isn’t a problem if government works well is to say that heavy taxation isn’t in and of itself a problem.

A second explanation looks to the mix of taxes countries use. The Nordic countries rely disproportionately on consumption taxes; in 2007 consumption taxes totaled 16% of GDP in Denmark and 13% in Sweden, compared to just 5% in the U.S. These are said to create less in the way of investment and work disincentives than do taxes on individual and corporate income.

Yet there is a sizeable difference in income taxation too. In the U.S. income taxes were 14% of GDP in 2007, versus 19% in Sweden and a whopping 29% in Denmark. More important, to suggest that heavy taxation isn’t harmful given an effective tax mix is to suggest that a high level of taxation per se is not necessarily harmful.

A third explanation points to tax compliance. Each April most Swedes receive a pre-prepared tax form. The relevant information about income, deductions, and the amount still owed or to be refunded has already been filled in by the Swedish Tax Agency. If the information is correct, the taxpayer simply confirms that by mail, telephone, or text message. Pre-prepared tax returns not only are more convenient for taxpayers; they also reduce cheating. Greater compliance, in turn, is likely to make heavy taxation more workable. If cheating is extensive, tax rates need to be higher in order to raise a given quantity of revenue, which increases the likelihood of disincentive effects on entrepreneurship, investment, and work effort. In a tax system with minimal cheating, more revenue can be raised at moderate tax rates.

This can’t be done in the United States, so the argument goes, because the American tax code (unlike its Swedish counterpart) has too many available deductions and rebates. But the U.S. could simplify its tax code to enable pre-preparation. Moreover, even with this advantage, income tax rates in Denmark and Sweden are a good bit higher than in the U.S. And a large portion of Danish and Swedish tax revenues come via payroll and/or consumption taxes, which are less vulnerable to evasion, in those countries and in the U.S. as well.

Two explanations that attempt to address the puzzle

Here are two accounts of Danish and Swedish economic performance that don’t sidestep the question of tax levels’ impact.

The first is hypothetical; I don’t know of anyone who’s offered this argument explicitly. It says that the adverse effect of taxation kicks in once a country passes 15% or 20% or 25% of GDP, and it doesn’t worsen the farther beyond that you go. Denmark, Sweden, and the United States each exceeded 25% already by 1960, so in this story we would expect the three countries to have experienced similar (poor) economic performance in subsequent years.

This hypothesis doesn’t strike me as especially compelling. None of the world’s rich nontiny democracies have had tax levels below 25% of GDP since the 1970s, and only a few have been below that level since 1960. Yet a number of these countries have had relatively good economic outcomes during this period.

A second explanation says the Danish and Swedish economies have performed similarly to America’s despite heavier taxes because they have some advantage(s) that I haven’t adjusted for. This certainly would be true if I had chosen Norway as one of the comparison countries. Norway’s economy has been boosted by extensive oil resources. Has Denmark or Sweden had any such advantage?

One possibility is catch-up. Laggard countries can get an economic growth boost by borrowing technology from the leaders. But this has become less relevant for Denmark and Sweden in recent decades, as they’ve invested heavily in education and R&D and become technological leaders in their own right (more here).

Ethnic and cultural homogeneity is sometimes mentioned as a key economic asset of the Nordic countries. This might help, though in rich nations diversity may have some benefits as well.

Corporatist policy making, which features institutionalized participation by business and labor representatives, is associated with faster economic growth in affluent countries in recent decades. This may have helped Denmark and Sweden. Yet both countries have made their share of policy mistakes.

Of course, the United States has some important advantages of its own, including a huge domestic market, excellent universities, a culture that prizes innovation and entrepreneurship, a well-developed venture capital system, bankruptcy laws that facilitate risk-taking, a tradition of regional mobility, and an attractiveness to talented immigrants. The question is: If taxation at Danish and Swedish levels has a significant negative economic effect, do Denmark and Sweden have advantages relative to the U.S. that are large enough to have fully offset that effect in recent decades? It’s a difficult question to answer with any certainty, but I think probably not.

A challenge

At what point does the harmful impact of taxes on the economy kick in? And how large is it? The Danish and Swedish experiences over the past generation pose a challenge for those who believe the answers to these two questions are “somewhere below 50% of GDP” and “large.” It’s a challenge that in my view has yet to be met.


Taxes and work

May 9, 2011

Working-age Belgians, French, and Germans spend, on average, about 1,000 hours a year in paid work. In the United States, Switzerland, and New Zealand, by contrast, the average is around 1,300. This is a pretty big difference.

These averages are determined by the share that have a paying job and the number of hours worked over the course of a year by those with a job. In the United States, for instance, the employment rate in 2007 was 72% and those employed worked an average of 1,800 hours (.72 x 1,800 = 1,296). In France, the employment rate was 64% and the average number of hours worked by those with a job was 1,550.

In a paper published in 2004, Edward Prescott concluded that taxes are the principal cause of the cross-country variation in working time. Prescott’s conclusion was based on the association between tax levels and work hours in the early 1970s and the mid-1990s in Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

The hypothesis is sensible. Taxes reduce the (direct) financial reward to paid work. This encourages people not to work at all or to work fewer hours.

But how large is the effect? After all, some people will work more when taxes are higher, in order to reach their desired after-tax income. More important, lots of other things affect people’s calculations about whether and how much to work, including wage levels, employment and working time regulations, paid vacation time and holidays, availability and generosity of government income transfers, access to health insurance and retirement benefits, the cost of services such as child care, and preferences for work versus leisure. A good recent study of work hours among those who have a job concludes that taxes seem to have an effect for women but not for men, and that taxes account for a limited portion of the cross-country variation. In own my research (here and here), I’ve found pretty strong indication that the tax mix matters; heavy reliance on payroll taxes is associated with slower increase in the employment rate over the past three decades. But that doesn’t necessarily tell us anything about the impact of overall tax levels.

Here is the association between annual work hours per working-age person in 2007 (before the crash) and tax revenues as a share of GDP over the years 1979 to 2007. The pattern looks supportive of the notion that high taxes reduce work hours.

But knowledgeable comparativists will notice a familiar clustering of countries. Here’s the same chart with three groups highlighted.

One group, in the lower-right corner, includes Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, France, and Belgium. These countries, along with Austria, have several features that might contribute to low work hours. One is strong unions. Organized labor has been the principal force pushing for a shorter work week, more holiday and vacation time, and earlier retirement. These nations also have been characterized by a preference for traditional family roles: breadwinner husband, homemaker wife. This preference, often associated with Catholicism and “Christian Democratic” political parties, is likely to influence women’s employment and work hours. It is manifested in lengthy paid maternity leaves, lack of government support for child care, income tax structures that discourage second earners within households, and practices such as German school days ending at lunch time and French schools being closed on Wednesday afternoons. These countries also fund their social insurance programs via heavy payroll taxes, the kind most likely to discourage employment growth.

A second group consists of the four Nordic nations: Denmark, Sweden, Finland, and Norway. These countries too have strong unions. But they also have had electorally successful social democratic parties, which have tended to promote high employment. Denmark and Sweden, in particular, have been at the forefront in use of active labor market programs to help get young or displaced persons into jobs, public employment to fill gaps in the private labor market, and government support for child care and preschool to facilitate women’s employment.

A third group of countries, in the upper-left corner, includes the United States, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada. These nations have relatively weak labor movements and limited influence of social democratic parties and Catholic traditional-family orientations.

The other five countries — Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom — are a hodgepodge. (Some would include Ireland and the U.K. in the “weak labor” group and Spain and Portugal in the “traditional family roles” group. Doing so doesn’t alter the conclusion here.)

Based on their institutional-political makeup, we would expect the weak-labor countries to have comparatively high work hours, the social democratic countries to be intermediate, and the traditional-family-roles countries to have low hours. As the following chart indicates, that’s exactly what we observe.

So is it really heavy taxation that produces comparatively low work hours? Or is it strong unions and preferences for traditional family roles? If we adjust for institutional-political group membership, the negative association between tax levels and work hours disappears.

Given that the institutional-political groupings account for much of the cross-country variation in levels of work, we might be better able to detect the true impact of taxes by examining changes. The following chart shows change in work hours from 1989 to 2007 by change in taxation from the 1980s to the 2000s. There is no association to speak of; the regression line is negatively sloped, but it is nearly flat and the countries are widely dispersed around it. Perhaps most revealing is the pattern among the twelve countries bunched around zero on the horizontal axis; despite little or no change in tax levels over this period, these nations varied sharply in the degree to which average work hours changed.

Is it levels of taxation, rather than changes, that cause changes in work hours? No; here too we find no association.

While heavy taxation surely creates some work disincentives, the overall tax level doesn’t seem to be an important determinant of differences in employment hours across the world’s rich countries.


To spend is to owe?

April 18, 2011

A high level of government spending doesn’t necessarily produce heavy government debt. Nor does low spending guarantee low debt. Debt levels are a function of government expenditures and revenues and economic growth.


Are progressive income taxes fair?

April 2, 2011

Kip Hagopian says no. He considers various arguments in favor of progressivity and isn’t persuaded. I appreciate Hagopian’s attempt to engage these arguments. Unfortunately, he says little or nothing about the three I find most compelling.

1. Luck. Many of the things that determine our incomes — intelligence, creativity, physical and social skills, motivation, persistence, confidence, connections, discrimination, occupation, employer, spouse, inherited wealth — are in significant measure a product of chance. They are heavily influenced by genes, our parents, our childhood neighborhood and schools, timing, and various fortuitous occurrences. Opponents of progressive taxation often emphasize the role of effort, but much of the variation in effort is itself a product of luck. (Progressive tax proponents sometimes fall into the trap of accepting the distinction between effort and luck; they’re then forced to argue that the latter matters more than the former.)

2. Ability to pay. Higher-income households tend to be able to pay not only more dollars but also a larger share of their income without suffering. One sign that this is true is that the savings rate increases with income; those with higher income tend to save a larger percentage. This may owe partly to a stronger future-orientation, but it’s mainly because they can afford to.

3. Income tax progressivity helps to offset the regressivity of other taxes. Some taxes are regressive, with higher-income households paying a smaller share of their income than lower-income households. Payroll (Social Security) and consumption (sales) taxes are the most prominent. If income taxes weren’t progressive, the tax system as a whole would be regressive.

Fairness is not the only criterion by which a tax system should be judged. We also need to consider how much revenue we want to raise and taxes’ impact on the economy. For my thoughts, see here and here.


Follow

Get every new post delivered to your Inbox.

Join 44 other followers