Lane Kenworthy, The Good Society
Economic, political, and social conditions are better in some nations than in others. Since we don’t get to choose which country we’re born in, fairness requires some opportunity for migration, particularly for the least well-off. Migration also can be a source of economic advance for recipient countries, with immigrants bringing new energy, ideas, and skills.
On the other hand, migration can pose challenges for recipient countries, from maintaining order and safety to protecting cultural norms and community to ensuring jobs and wages for native-born citizens. And sending nations can suffer from “brain drain” if their most talented depart.
What impact has immigration had on America and Americans? What is our immigration policy? How might we change it going forward?
MIGRATION TO THE US AND OTHER COUNTRIES
In 2015, 244 million people, about 3.5% of the world’s population, lived outside their country of birth.1 If immigrants were a country, it would be the fifth largest.
Major source nations include India (16 million), Mexico (12 million), China (10 million), the Philippines (5 million), and Syria (5 million). The chief recipients are the world’s affluent countries, where about 70% of migrants go.2
As figure 1 shows, there’s been a gradual rise in migration since 1980.
America has long been a land of immigrants. The US population consists almost entirely of the descendants of immigrants; Native Americans are only about 1%. And the US is home to more current migrants than any other country — about 45 million. The largest source countries are Mexico (12 million), China (2.5 million), and India (2 million).
Figure 2 shows the foreign-born share of the US population since the mid-1800s. The immigrant share peaked in the early 1900s, then fell sharply, then rose again beginning in the 1970s. The level today, around 13% of the population, is close to the peak of a century ago.
While America hosts the largest number of foreign-born persons, our foreign-born population share is only middle-of-the-pack among the world’s rich democratic nations, as figure 3 shows.
HISTORY OF US IMMIGRATION POLICY
America’s immigration policy was minimally restrictive in the 1800s and early 1900s. It turned heavily restrictive from 1921 to 1965. Since 1965 it has been moderately restrictive. These shifts in policy are the main cause of the over-time changes in immigration flows we see in figure 2 above.3
Prior to the 1920s there were few limits on immigration into the US. Exceptions included an 1882 law limiting immigration from China (completion of the transcontinental railroad in 1869 reduced the need for Chinese laborers), an 1892 law barring immigrants with severe diseases, and a 1917 literacy requirement for immigrants over age 16.
By the early 1900s, immigrants to the United States increasingly were coming from southern and eastern Europe. Many were Catholic or Jewish. Given religious intolerance and stereotypes about laziness, these changes led to growing public discomfort with immigration. World War I and the 1917 Russian revolution added a worry about the potential spread of communism. In 1921, congress passed the Quota Law, profoundly altering America’s immigration policy. Together with amendments in 1924 and 1929, the Quota Law limited the annual number of immigrants from each country to 3% of the persons of that nationality currently in the US. The aim was to reduce the volume of immigration and freeze its existing ethnic mix.
Over the following four decades there was only one noteworthy exception to the Quota Law’s restrictionist orientation. From the 1940s to the mid-1960s, the Bracero Program allowed up to 500,000 Mexicans to enter the US each year as temporary guest workers.
In 1965, the Immigration Act reoriented US immigration policy. It ended the national origins system, though it retained an upper limit on the total number of legal immigrants. It instituted a system for ranking immigration applicants, with preference given first to family reunification and second to persons with needed skills. The new law also ended the guest worker arrangement with Mexico and established a cap on the number of immigrants from the Western hemisphere (later changed to a cap per country).
While the 1965 law remains the basis of our immigration policy policy today, there were two important amendments in the 1980s. First, the 1980 Refugee Act exempted political refugees from the numeric limit. The number of refugees permitted to enter is decided each year by the president and congress. Second, illegal immigration into the US increased steadily after the guest worker program with Mexico was ended in 1965. The 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act offered a path to citizenship (amnesty) for illegal immigrants living in the US since 1982 but also attempted to deter further illegal immigration by imposing stiff penalties on businesses caught employing undocumented workers.
The 1986 act was the last major change to US immigration law. In 2006 and 2007 the Bush administration tried to pass immigration reform bills proposing something similar to the 1986 law — a path to citizenship for illegal immigrants who have been here for several years coupled with stronger penalties on businesses that employ illegals. Each bill passed in one body of congress but failed to pass in the other.4
In 2012 and 2014, the Obama administration issued executive actions shielding from deportation persons who were brought to the United States illegally as children and undocumented parents of US citizens and permanent residents. However, these were blocked by the courts in 2016.
Much of the debate about immigration has to do with its economic consequences. As consumers, Americans benefit from low-skilled immigrants via reduced cost of housing construction and of various services. But do low-skilled immigrants reduce jobs and wages for low-skilled native-born Americans? Social scientists disagree about the answer to this question. Some conclude that they do reduce employment and/or wages, and that the impact is large.5 Others have found that they do, but just a little.6 Some recent analyses conclude that there is no such impact.7
Do immigrants cost more in government services and transfers than they pay in taxes? Here there is more agreement among researchers. Just as among native-born Americans, immigrants with low education are a net minus and those with high education are a net plus.8
How does immigration affect adherence to our country’s traditional values? One view is that growing diversity of ethnicity, cultures, and religions inevitably brings a dilution of such values. The composition of immigration may also matter. In the early 1900s, more than 90% of immigrants came from Europe, whereas now only about 10% do. However, the evidence suggests that this worry may be misplaced. Today’s immigrants, on average, are more likely to be employed, less likely to divorce, and attend church more frequently than native-born Americans.9
A related concern is about immigration’s impact on community and inclusion. A century ago each immigrant group was so small (Polish Jews, Italian Catholics, etc.) that it had little hope of preserving its culture for more than a generation or two. And a fluid economy provided lots of opportunity for upward mobility. Immigrants therefore tended to assimilate by the second or third generation — speaking English, marrying outside the group, integrating into schools, employment, occupation, and residential location, and holding similar beliefs about key social and political issues. They became part of the broader American community rather than maintaining separate communities of their own.
The chief worry with respect to community and inclusion is about Mexicans and other Latinos, who account for a large share of the past generation’s immigrants. The size and persistence of the influx of Latino migrants exceeds that of previous immigrant groups, economic circumstances faced by people with limited skills may be more challenging today than in the past, and access to non-English entertainment and other media has increased significantly.10 As it turns out, however, the data indicate that the children of new immigrants, including Latinos, are assimilating just as rapidly and effectively as their predecessors.11
At the same time, we could be doing better at facilitating integration. The Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) regularly assesses policies and immigrants’ outcomes in the world’s rich nations.12 As figure 4 shows, America’s policies are only moderately effective relative to those of the best performers.
A final concern about immigration has to do with politics and political backlash. People are less likely to empathize with those they see as different. While skin color is in principle an unimportant difference, for some it is a real or imagined marker of distinct norms, behaviors, and values. Members of a racial or ethnic group may therefore feel threatened by members of other groups. That can be particularly true when one group historically has held a dominant position vis-à-vis another, as with whites and African Americans in the United States, or where racial/ethnic difference is coupled with a sharp difference in religion, as with native populations in rich countries and Muslim immigrants. Difference can prompt not just uncertainty and discomfort but also fear.13
When this happens, people’s thinking can turn — or return — to a scarcity orientation. This reduces sentiment for fairness, personal freedom, and government programs that insure against loss. Instead, people tend to focus on protecting what they have, including the cultural norms and values they see as integral to their way of life. If they perceive these norms and values to be threatened by another group that is growing in size or newly prominent or assertive, they may turn to protective mode. When threats to existing patterns of life are coupled with a perceived threat to economic well-being and/or physical safety, the reaction may be even more intense.14
These developments may lead to a political backlash by the dominant group. This, according to one view, is what has precipitated the growing electoral support for anti-immigrant political parties and candidates in western Europe and the United States in recent decades.15
Is political backlash to immigration likely to be a long-run phenomenon that damages politics and decreases well-being? Or is it a temporary hurdle on the road to a more just society?
One case, the California experience, suggests grounds for guarded optimism.16 In the first two-thirds of the twentieth century, California’s economy grew rapidly — propelled by natural resources, heavy investment in public goods (water, roads, ports, education), population inflow from other states, and emerging manufacturing industries. In the 1970s, however, the state struggled, like the nation as a whole, with rising unemployment and inflation. A decade later the decline of manufacturing jobs, also a nationwide phenomenon, began to bite, and in the 1990s California’s defense-oriented manufacturing sector was hit hard by the end of the cold war. During this period the state also experienced an enormous rise in immigration. In 1960, California was home to 9% of America’s population and 13% of its immigrants. By 1990, California had 12% of the nation’s population and 32% of its immigrants.
These changes created, in Manuel Pastor’s words, “a perfect stew of racial anxiety and economic drift.” In concert with other developments — the 1960s counterculture and antiwar movement, urban riots, surging crime, and rapidly-rising property taxes — they sparked a popular backlash. In the 1980s, 1990s, and early 2000s, Californians elected law-and-order, tough-on-immigration Republicans to the governorship and prominent mayoral positions, and they voted in favor of a series of referendums to reduce taxes and limit supports for immigrants and minorities. In 1978, Californians passed Proposition 13, which reduced property tax revenues and limited future property tax increases, putting a crimp in funding for K-12 schools. It also hampered the state government’s ability to raise general tax revenues by requiring than any proposed revenue increase get a two-thirds majority, rather that a simple majority, in both legislative bodies. Other referendums affirmed by California voters banned school busing and reversed other school desegregation mechanisms (1972, later ruled unconstitutional by the state’s Supreme Court); banned affirmative action by the state government and other public entities, including in university admissions (1996); restricted bilingual education in schools (1998); prohibited unauthorized immigrants from having access to public services (1994, also later ruled unconstitutional); mandated a minimum sentence of 25 years for persons with a third felony conviction (1994); required juveniles accused of certain crimes to be treated as adults (2000); and imposed term limits on state legislators (1990).
By the mid-2000s, however, California’s economy had found a new footing, led by the success of digital tech firms in Palo Alto and San Francisco. And while the state’s population had become even more diverse, its white inhabitants had had more time to come to terms with this reality. The last gasp of the conservative backlash came in 2005, when Republican governor Arnold Schwarzenegger called a special election aimed at passing a set of propositions limiting state spending, labor union power, and teacher tenure. All of his initiatives were voted down. Over the past two decades Californians have turned away from a politics of traditionalism and fear, and the state has enacted, via the legislature and referendums, an array of public social programs that put it well ahead of the federal government.17
What do other historical experiences suggest? Key cases worth exploring include the large-scale migration of African Americans from the south to the midwest and northeast in the first half of the 1900s and Sweden’s absorption of a large number of refugees since the early 1990s.18
OPTIONS FOR POLICY CHANGE
One option for the United States is to continue with its current policy. In some respects the immigration policy in place since the mid-1960s has worked reasonably well. As noted earlier, the best available evidence suggests that the past half century’s immigrants have tended to adhere more to traditional American values than their US-born counterparts do and that they may have had little or no adverse impact on employment or wages of low-skilled native-born workers. Like low-skilled natives, low-skilled immigrants tend to use more in government services than they pay in taxes, but they may more than offset this by helping to reduce the price of houses and other goods and services. The second and third generation of the past half century’s immigrants have tended to assimilate just as thoroughly as their predecessors of a century ago. A healthy majority of Americans believe that immigration “is a good thing for this country today” (rather than a bad thing) and that immigrants today “strengthen our country because of their hard work and talents” (rather than being “a burden on our country because they take our jobs, housing, and health care”), as figures 5 and show. Finally, as we see in figure 7, illegal immigration, the source of much of the dislike of our existing policy, has been negative over the past decade. Unauthorized immigrants’ share of the US population is lower now than in 2007. Given these considerations, some will ask “Why change the policy?”
One argument in favor of change is that even if immigration’s effects on America’s economy and society have been muted, our policy approach corrodes tolerance and trust. As Christopher Jencks puts it, “The federal government’s policy of opposing illegal immigration while refusing to enforce laws against hiring illegal immigrants has had huge costs. It has exacerbated popular distrust of the federal government (…). It has also increased hostility to foreigners, especially Mexicans, who are all suspected of having entered the country illegally. To many Americans Washington’s failure to control illegal immigration … is just another example of how out of touch, duplicitous, and incompetent federal officials really are.”19
What policy changes could we make?
The most restrictive type of proposal is to reduce the volume of both legal and illegal immigration. A particularly draconian version of this would be a “zero immigration” policy.20 Some Americans might support this, but probably not enough for lawmakers to give it serious consideration. As figure 8 shows, the share of Americans who say they favor decreasing immigration has rarely exceeded 50%, and it currently is at its lowest level since polling began in the mid-1970s. Figure 9 separates views about legal immigrants from those about illegal immigrants. Only 30% of the public want to reduce the amount of legal immigration at all, much less to zero. This share probably would be even lower if Americans had a more accurate sense of immigrants’ prevalence. According to a 2014 survey, Americans think immigrants are 32% of the US population, when actually they’re about 13%.21
A more popular restrictionist approach is to clamp down on illegal immigration. Figure 9 shows that as of the most recent polling, about 60% of Americans support doing so. Interestingly, though, support for reducing illegal immigration has dropped over the past two decades.
How could we reduce illegal immigration? One strategy is to locate unauthorized immigrants and deport them. During the 2016 presidential campaign, Donald Trump promised to deport all 11 million illegal immigrants currently in the US. That would be a tall order. The number of deportations has risen sharply in recent decades, from an average of 20,000 per year during the Reagan administration to 400,000 per year during the Obama administration, as figure 10 shows. Yet as figure 11 reveals, this represents a tiny fraction of the illegal immigrants in the country.
An alternative approach is to prevent illegal immigrants from entering the country in the first place. Historically, our chief strategy for doing so has been to enact harsh penalties on employers caught hiring unauthorized immigrants, the idea being that if the economic incentive to come to the US is weakened, far fewer people will be willing to endure the significant risks entailed in crossing the border illegally. The 1986 immigration reform included such penalties, and various states, such as Arizona, have enacted others over the years. But employers strongly oppose them, so they are enforced with limited consistency and vigor. In a typical year, only 2,500 employers — about 3 out of every 10,000 — are investigated for violating immigration laws.22
Donald Trump’s signature pledge during the 2016 presidential campaign was to build a giant wall along the entire border with Mexico. Whether he will follow through with this, and whether it will work if he does, remains to be seen. Janet Napolitano, former governor of Arizona and Secretary of Homeland Security, once quipped “Show me a 50-foot wall and I’ll show you a 51-foot ladder.”23 Portions of the border already have been walled off over the past several decades, and money spent on border control activities has risen sharply since the mid-1980s, as figure 12 shows. This appeared to have little impact in the 1990s, but since 2000 border apprehensions of immigrants attempting to enter the United States illegally have dropped sharply, as we see in figure 13. At the same time, the policy of enhanced border security appears to have had the unintended effect of causing more Mexican immigrants who do enter the US illegally to remain in the country, whereas previously such immigrants tended to circulate back and forth.24
A different approach to reducing illegal immigration would be to reinstate a temporary (“guest”) worker program for migrants from Mexico and perhaps other countries.25 This would allow a specified number of people to enter the US to work for one to three years, as we did with Mexico from 1942 to 1964. We already have a “temporary work visa” program, but until recently it allowed in mostly highly-educated (H1B) workers.26 Over the past decade the program has sharply increased the number of agricultural workers (H2A) it admits, as figure 14 shows. Along with the 2008-09 economic crisis, this may be the key reason why unauthorized immigration has decreased during this period (figure 7). While this rise in temporary migrant workers may satisfy the wishes of employers, who want an abundant supply of low-wage workers, and of those who want a reduction in illegal immigration, there are potential concerns: Will the logistics of forcing such a large number of guest workers to leave prove too difficult? And is it good to have a large group of people in the country who have no political rights?
Another suggestion is for the United States to boost its efforts to assist Mexico’s economic development. Illegal immigration is driven mainly by the search for economic betterment, so improving economic conditions in source countries will tend to reduce it. The 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was a good first step. It reduced the cost of importing products from Mexico into the United States and thereby encouraged creation of factories (“maquiladoras”) and businesses in Mexico. But China’s rise as a site for low-cost manufacturing, particularly after 2000, limited NAFTA’s benefits for Mexico. A more aggressive proposal is for something like a Marshall Plan for Mexico — massive financial assistance for infrastructure development, job creation, schools, and poverty alleviation.
Change the composition of immigration
Some favor leaving the overall volume of legal immigration more or less intact but shifting its composition. Since the early 1990s the US has let in a total of roughly one million legal permanent (non-temporary-work-visa) immigrants per year. Family reunification accounts for about 65%, skills 15%, refugees 10%, and other special categories the remainder.27 As figure 15 shows, the share of immigrants with even a high school degree has stalled in recent decades. One proposal is to prioritize skills rather than family reunification in the legal immigration system.28 That might give a boost to our economy and reduce the net cost of immigrants to taxpayers, though it isn’t clear how large the gain would be.
The chief argument against shifting toward an emphasis on immigrants’ likely economic contribution is that it might reduce opportunity for the most needy. The United States already is mediocre in its generosity toward migrants from less-affluent countries and toward refugees, as figure 16 suggests.
Others favor greater openness in our approach to immigration rather than more restrictiveness or a change in composition. One proposal is for a path to citizenship for some or all of the 11 million unauthorized immigrants currently in the United States. A second is to halt deportation of undocumented immigrants who were brought to the US when they were children and those who are parents of US citizens and permanent residents.
A third is to take in more refugees. A refugee is “someone who has been forced to flee his or her country because of persecution, war or violence. A refugee has a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership in a particular social group.”29 The United Nations estimates that 68 million people were displaced from their homes by war or persecution as of 2017, the largest number since World War II. Of these, 43 million were still living in their country of origin while 25 million were in another country.30 The most visible crisis is Syria’s. Since 2011, around 5 million Syrians have left because of that country’s civil war. Most are in Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, and Iraq. Germany pledged to take 100,000, other European Union (EU) countries 30,000. The United States agreed to accept only 10,000.31 According to the 1951 UN Refugee Convention, ratified by 145 countries, refugees should not be returned to a country where they face serious threats to their life or freedom. This is now considered a rule of customary international law.
Figure 17 shows that the United States typically admits fewer than 100,000 refugees per year. And in figure 18 we see that relative to its population size, US acceptance of refugees in recent decades has been fairly stingy. Since 2000, the most welcoming nation, Sweden, has had an average yearly refugee inflow equal to 0.4% of its population. In the US, the figure has been 0.04%, or one tenth of the Swedish level.
Perhaps the most controversial proposal of all is for the US to adopt an “open immigration” approach. The moral argument in favor of doing so is straightforward: birth country is no less accidental than is birth location within a country, and it tends to be far more consequential. Freedom and equality of opportunity require the ability to choose where one lives.32 Opponents warn this could lead to overwhelming numbers of people moving from poor or politically repressive countries to rich democratic ones. Open immigration advocates point to the European Union’s experience with open borders. Skeptics feared an unmanageable flood of migrants from Romania, Poland, and other poor member countries to Germany, France, the UK, and other affluent ones. But it didn’t happen.33
Things might play out differently if the United States were to open its borders to Mexico and the rest of Latin America, given the large Latino population already here. Nor does the EU experience tell us what would happen if rich countries were opened to immigration from the world’s poorest ones. In addition, while the economics of intra-EU immigration have proved manageable, the politics have been more problematic, with nationalist parties rising in popularity in nearly all western European nations.34
Prospects for immigration policy reform
Until recently, immigration was a less partisan issue than many others in American politics. Republicans were divided, with the base tending to want less immigration while the business community preferred more. Democrats, too, were conflicted, with some supporting immigration at or above the levels of recent decades while labor unions wanted reductions. These intraparty divisions might have created an opportunity for agreement on a significant shift in our immigration policy. Yet major reform efforts by presidents Bush (George W.) and Obama failed.
Since 2007, immigration has become more straightforwardly partisan, with Republicans favoring a restrictive approach and Democrats favoring greater protections and a path to citizenship for current illegal immigrants. That isn’t likely to increase the odds of reform.
Around the world, about one in thirty persons are migrants, and this share has been rising in recent decades. A significant number of them, particularly those who are economic and political refugees, face difficulty in finding a host country or in successfully integrating into one.
After a restrictive period in the middle of the twentieth century, since 1965 America’s immigration policy has been fairly welcoming, and the foreign-born share of the US population has returned to its previous high, around 13%, of a century ago. Compared to other rich democratic nations, however, our immigrant share is only average.
Immigrants tend to benefit from migrating to the US, and native-born Americans tend to benefit as consumers. A potentially vulnerable group is low-skilled US-born workers, but social scientists have reached mixed conclusions about immigration’s impact on their employment and wages. The children of the past half century’s immigrants have been assimilating into American society in numbers and ways similar to their predecessors in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
Americans disagree about how, if at all, our current immigration policy should be changed, with proposals ranging from reduced openness to heightened focus on immigrant skills to citizenship for existing unauthorized immigrants to increased openness. Illegal immigration has dominated political debate over the past decade, even though it has decreased significantly during this period.
- Michael Dimock, “Leaving Home,” Pew Research Center, 2016, using United Nations data. ↩
- Dimock, “Leaving Home.” ↩
- Douglas S. Massey, “The New Latino Underclass: Immigration Enforcement as a Race-Making Institution,” Tobin Project, 2010; Julia Preston, “The Truth About Mexican-Americans,” New York Review of Books, 2015. ↩
- Christopher Jencks, “The Immigration Charade,” New York Review of Books, 2007. ↩
- George J. Borjas, Heaven’s Door: Immigration Policy and the American Economy, Princeton University Press, 1999; Borjas, “The Wage Impact of the Marielitos: A Reappraisal,” 2015. ↩
- David Card, “Is the New Immigration Really So Bad?,” 2005. ↩
- Giovanni Peri, “Does Immigration Hurt the Poor?,” Pathways, 2014. ↩
- James T. Smith and Barry Edmondston, eds., The New Americans: Economic, Demographic, and Fiscal Effects of Immigration, National Academies Press, 1997; National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine (NAS), The Integration of Immigrants into American Society, National Academies Press, 2015. ↩
- Steven A. Camarota, “The Employment Situation of Immigrants and Natives in the Fourth Quarter of 2015,” Center for Immigration Studies; Zhenchao Qian, “Divergent Paths of American Families,” US2010 Project, 2013; General Social Survey, sda.berkeley.edu, series attend. ↩
- Samuel P. Huntington, Who Are We: The Challenges to America’s National Identity, Simon and Schuster, 2004; Reihan Salam, Melting Pot or Civil War?, Sentinel, 2018. ↩
- NAS, The Integration of Immigrants into American Society. ↩
- Özge Bilgili, Thomas Huddleston, and Anne-Linde Joki, “The Dynamics between Integration Policies and Outcomes: a Synthesis of the Literature,” 2015. ↩
- Alberto Alesina and Edward L. Glaeser, Fighting Poverty in the US and Europe, Oxford University Press, 2004; Marisa Abrajano and Zoltan L. Hajnal, White Backlash: Immigration, Race, and American Politics, Princeton University Press, 2015; Arlie Russell Hochschild, Strangers in Their Own Land: Anger and Mourning on the American Right, New Press, 2016. ↩
- Christian Welzel, Freedom Rising: Human Empowerment and the Quest for Emancipation, Cambridge University Press, 2013; Ronald F. Inglehart, Cultural Evolution, Cambridge University Press, 2018. ↩
- Abrajano and Hajnal, White Backlash; Sasha Polakow-Suransky, Go Back to Where You Came From: The Backlash Against Immigration and the Fate of Western Democracy, Bold Type Books, 2017; Diane Mutz, “Status Threat, Not Economic Hardship, Explains the 2016 Presidential Vote.” PNAS, 2018; David Frum, “How Much Immigration Is Too Much?,” The Atlantic, 2019; Noam Gidron and Peter A. Hall, “Populism as a Problem of Social Integration”; Eric Kaufmann, Whiteshift: Populism, Immigration, and the Future of White Majorities, Abrams Press, 2019. ↩
- Peter Leyden and Ruy Teixeira, “California Is the Future of American Politics,” Medium, 2017; Manuel Pastor, State of Resistance: What California’s Dizzying Descent and Remarkable Resurgence Mean for America’s Future, The New Press, 2018. ↩
- Leyden and Teixeira, “California Is the Future of American Politics”; Lane Kenworthy, Social Democratic Capitalism, Oxford University Press, 2019, ch. 8. ↩
- On the “great migration,” see Christine Leibbrand, Catherine Massey, J. Trent Alexander, and Stewart Tolnay, “Neighborhood Attainment Outcomes for Children of the Great Migration,” American Journal of Sociology, 2019. On the Swedish case, see James Traub, “The Death of the Most Generous Nation on Earth,” Foreign Policy, 2016; Lane Kenworthy, “Is Sweden Failing on Immigration?,” Consider the Evidence, 2018. ↩
- Jencks, “The Immigration Charade.” ↩
- Patrick J. Buchanan, State of Emergency: The Third World Invasion and Conquest of America, Thomas Dunne, 2006. In campaigning for the presidency in 2016, Donald Trump argued for a “pause” (of unspecified duration) on all immigration. ↩
- Ipsos, “Perceptions Are Not Reality: Things the World Gets Wrong,” 2014. ↩
- Jencks, “The Immigration Charade”; Wayne Cornelius, “Why Immigrants Won’t Self-Deport,” Los Angeles Times, 2016. ↩
- Marc Lacey, “Arizona Officials, Fed Up with U.S. Efforts, Seek Donations to Build Border Fence,” New York Times, 2011. ↩
- Douglas S. Massey, Jorge Durand, and Karen A. Pren, “Why Border Enforcement Backfired,” American Journal of Sociology, 2016. ↩
- Michael A. Clemens and Lant Pritchett, “Temporary Work Visas: A Four-Way Win for the Middle Class, Low-Skill Workers, Border Security, and Migrants,” Center for Global Development, 2013. ↩
- American Immigration Council, “Employment-Based Visa Categories in the United States,” 2016. ↩
- Douglas S. Massey, “The Great Decline in American Immigration?,”“The Great Decline in American Immigration?,” Pathways, 2012; American Immigration Council, “How the United States Immigration System Works: A Fact Sheet”; Department of Homeland Security, Yearbook of Immigration Statistics. ↩
- Salam, Melting Pot or Civil War? ↩
- United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “What Is a Refugee?” See also Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, United Nations, 1951; Global Compact on Refugees, United Nations, 2018. ↩
- Megan Specia, “The Five Conflicts Driving the Bulk of the World’s Refugee Crisis,” New York Times, 2018; David Miliband, Rescue: Refugees and the Political Crisis of Our Time, Simon and Schuster, 2017. ↩
- Max Fisher and Amanda Taub, “The Refugee Crisis: 9 Questions You Were Too Embarrassed to Ask,” Vox, 2015; Daniel Smilov, “The Argument Against Compassion: Europe and the Refugees,” openDemocracy, 2015; Miliband, Rescue. ↩
- Bryan Caplan and Vipul Naik, “A Radical Case for Open Borders,” 2014; Alex Tabarrok, “The Case for Getting Rid of Borders — Completely,” The Atlantic, 2015. ↩
- Douglas S. Massey, “Caution, NAFTA at Work: How Europe’s Trade Model Could Solve America’s Immigration Problem,” Pacific Standard, 2008. ↩
- “Europe’s Rising Far Right: A Guide to the Most Prominent Parties,” New York Times, 2016. ↩