Lane Kenworthy, The Good Society
Women in America couldn’t own and control property until 1849. They weren’t allowed to vote until 1920. Prior to 1965, employers were free to discriminate against women in hiring, pay, and promotion. There has never been a female president of the United States. Yet the past half century has witnessed significant improvement on many economic, social, and political indicators.1 How far has America come toward full inclusion of women? How do we compare to other rich democratic nations?
In school enrollment and completion, American women have not only caught up with men but passed them. Figure 1 shows that equality was reached in college completion by the early 1990s, and by 2017 women led men by 7 percentage points.
This holds beyond college as well. Figure 2 shows that the female share of enrollees in postbaccalaureate programs grew from around 35% in 1970 to nearly 60% in the mid-2000s, where it has remained. Even in some traditionally male-dominated fields, such as medicine, women have attained near parity.
What explains this? A leading hypothesis is that the structure of K-12 classes favors females, particularly by rewarding the ability to sit still and concentrate for extended periods.2
Among prime-working-age American men, the employment rate has been falling, at a steady pace, since 1970. The story is very different for women, among whom, as we see in figure 3, the employment rate increased throughout the second half of the twentieth century. The causes of women’s growing employment are varied and mutually reinforcing: rising educational attainment, declining discrimination in the labor market and hence growing opportunity for a good job and good pay, technological and social shifts giving women greater control over reproduction, and changes in gender norms.
What also stands out in figure 3 is the fact that the rise in employment among women stopped at the turn of the century. Not only does this break with the long-run trend; it also contrasts with developments in a number of other rich democratic countries, as figure 4 shows. In 2000, the US had the sixth highest prime-age women’s employment rate among these countries. A decade and a half later, it ranked sixteenth.
One hypothesis suggests that the stalling of women’s employment after 2000 and its contrast with the trend in other affluent nations owes to our limited family-friendly policy.3 Many Americans with prekindergarten children want to combine family with paid work. But full-time out-of-home care for a child under age five costs, on average, about $9,500 per year.4 That’s a very large sum, particularly for those with low incomes. (Average yearly income in the lowest fifth of US households is $20,000.5) Faced with such unaffordable costs, some parents settle for care that is mediocre or poor, while others forgo employment.
Denmark and Sweden pioneered a different approach.6 Beginning in the 1960s, these countries introduced and then steadily expanded paid parental leave and publicly-funded childcare and preschool. Today, Swedish and Danish parents can take a paid year off work following the birth of a child. After that, parents can put the child in a public or licensed private early education center. The quality tends to be high, as early education teachers get training and pay comparable to elementary school teachers. Parents pay a fee, but the cost is capped at less than 10% of a household’s income.
We can see the impact in employment patterns. Among mothers whose youngest child is six to sixteen years old, and thus eligible for free K-12 schooling, the employment rate in the United States is just a few percentage points lower than in Denmark and Sweden. Among mothers with a child younger than six, it’s 15 percentage points lower.7
In recent decades many other rich nations have moved toward the types and generosity levels of the Nordic family-friendly policies, and a number of them have pulled ahead of the US in women’s employment. We’ve done far less. Our federal government mandates 12 weeks of unpaid family leave in medium-sized and large firms, and it funds Head Start for very poor families. A few states have paid parental leave policies, and few others have preschool for 4-year-olds.8
TYPES OF JOBS
Women and men tend to work in different types of jobs. Social scientists call this occupational sex segregation. A common measure of the degree of occupational sex segregation is the share of women or men who would have to switch to a different occupation in order for each occupation to have the same share of women and men as the overall labor force. Figure 5 shows that the degree of occupational segregation decreased steadily from 1960 to 2000. But it remains high, and the downward trend has stalled since 2000.
There still are many jobs in which women are overrepresented: secretary, childcare worker, dental assistant, receptionist, typist, bank teller, household cleaner, nurse, elementary school teacher, librarian, file clerk, cashier, waiter/waitress. There also are quite a few in which women are underrepresented: carpenter, firefighter, mechanic, airplane pilot, electrician, truck driver, machinist, engineer, farmworker, architect, police/detective, janitor/cleaner, doctor. Part of the reason why this is of interest is because jobs in which women are underrepresented tend to pay more than those in which they are overrepresented.
Women are heavily underrepresented in top-level economic positions, a phenomenon commonly referred to as the “glass ceiling.” In the 500 largest US firms, women held 27% of senior officer (vice president or higher) positions in 2017, up from 9% in 1995. They were 5% of the CEOs, up from less than 1% in 1995. They held 20% of the board director positions in these firms, up from 10% in 1995.9
Figure 6 shows that women’s representation on corporate boards has been rising in recent years in many of the rich democratic countries. The United States has lagged behind somewhat. A key contributor to the rapid rise in some nations is quotas. Norway was the first nation to adopt a quota, requiring large Norwegian firms to have at least 40% of their board members as women by 2008.
What are the causes of occupational sex segregation?10 One set influences the choices females and males make about what types of skills to obtain and what types of jobs to pursue.
Begin with sex-role socialization. Differential socialization of girls and boys causes differing preferences (tastes) for types of work, so females and males choose these types of work. There is only a weak relationship between young people’s occupational aspirations and the occupations they actually end up in as adults.11 Yet socialization may lead girls and boys to choose particular educational tracks — boys in math and science, girls in literature — that limit their career choices in adulthood.
If differential socialization of girls and boys plays a role in causing occupational sex segregation, a straightforward corrective is to raise children in a more gender-neutral manner. The women’s movement and changes in gender norms since the 1960s have led many parents and teachers to do just that, which may be part of the reason why occupational sex segregation has declined in recent decades.
Another explanation suggests that differing choices about schooling are rational responses to the fact that women are more likely to want to become a part- or full-time homemaker. Knowing they will be out of the labor force for some time, women make fewer investments in education and skill development (human capital), which leaves them less qualified for high-paying jobs.12 Although surely important historically, it’s unclear how much this matters in the contemporary context, given that for more than two decades women have tended to get more education than men rather than less.
Biological explanations suggest that differing preferences of women and men stem from genetic differences. On average, women have better memory for details, proximal senses, fine motor skills, verbal skills, and interpersonal skills, while men have better spatial perception, sense of direction, and math skills and are more aggressive and have greater physical strength.
Other explanations turn the focus from differing preferences to societal obstacles. One emphasizes discrimination by employers. Several types of evidence suggest that this matters. The first is statistical evidence. Even after controlling for education, training, years of work experience, and time off the job, part of the pay gap between women and men cannot be accounted for. Second, lawsuits filed against companies sometimes reveal direct or indirect evidence of gender discrimination. A third type comes from auditing studies in which similarly-matched pairs of women and men apply for jobs. These studies frequently yield evidence of differential treatment. A fourth type is blind auditions. Symphony orchestras now hide candidates who are auditioning behind a screen to prevent the judges from knowing anything about the identity of the candidate. This tends to significantly increase the probability that a woman will be hired.13
Why would employers discriminate against women? After all, companies presumably benefit from hiring the most capable people, regardless of their sex. One reason is traditional or sexist beliefs about appropriate gender roles. Some men continue to think that women belong at home or are less capable in the workplace.14
A second reason is employers’ reliance on statistical averages. There is an inherent degree of ignorance in the hiring process: it’s hard to know for certain who is going to perform best in a particular job. Given multiple roughly equivalent applicants, the best anyone can do is to make an educated guess. Employers sometimes make assumptions based on (assumed) average capabilities or behaviors of women and men and use these assumptions in choosing who to hire. One such assumption is that women are more likely to leave their job periodically to have children or care for other family members. Another is that men are better at managerial tasks. Treating individuals differently on the basis of group averages is called “statistical discrimination.”
Third, people tend to feel more comfortable with others like themselves. Men tend to feel more comfortable around other men, and many of those making hiring decisions for high-paying jobs are men.15
Fourth, companies may believe their customers or employees prefer a certain sex. Until the early 1970s, for example, airlines refused to hire male flight attendants because they felt their passengers preferred stewardesses. The Supreme Court declared this illegal in 1971. Firms have long believed that customers prefer male salespersons, though this has changed in recent years.
A fifth cause of discrimination is employer attempts to “divide and conquer.” Some jobs are more desirable than others. Employers reason that if they segregate these two types of jobs based on an ascriptive characteristic, such as sex (or race), workers will be less likely to identify with each other and thus less likely to form a union or demand better pay or working conditions. It’s a way of dividing the workforce.
A final contributor to occupational sex segregation is a range of actions by men sometimes grouped under the term “patriarchy.” This view suggests that men in various positions in society — husbands, workers, legislators, employers — combine (unconsciously) to keep women in a subordinate position. In the late 1800s and early 1900s male-dominated craft unions barred women, thereby keeping them out of certain types of jobs. Male politicians in the US (unlike those in other developed countries) have been unwilling to provide significant government funding for childcare or paid maternity leave, thereby discouraging at least some women from working outside the home. And boyfriends and husbands may discourage women from pursuing a career, or an especially demanding one. Men are less likely to want a date with a woman who is more intelligent or ambitious than they are. Becoming a chief executive or winning election to political office increases the likelihood that a woman will subsequently get divorced.16
Women tend to get paid less than men. Figure 7 shows the female/male pay ratio — the earnings of the median woman relative to those of the median man. The ratio held constant at around .60 between 1960 and 1980. In the 1980s and 1990s it improved significantly. Since 2000 it has increased only slightly. It currently stands at about .80.
Note that this figure is for women and men with full-time year-round jobs. The gap would be larger if part-timers were included, as women are more likely to work part-time jobs.
What are the key causes of the pay gap?17
One is that men average more hours of work per year than women, even among persons employed full-time year-round.
A second cause is differences in productivity, though there is considerable disagreement about how much this matters. As already noted, men no longer have an advantage in education. On the other hand, because their work careers are less likely to be interrupted, they tend to have more years on the job, which may contribute to productivity. Some have speculated that because of their household responsibilities, women exert less effort on the job, but studies of work effort don’t support this.18
Differences in the types of jobs women and men work contribute to the pay gap. Figure 8 gives a flavor of this. It shows the female composition and pay level of some large occupations. Those dominated by women tend to be lower-paying than those dominated by men. Occupational sex segregation is one reason for this. Men also are more likely to work in “core” or “monopoly” industries, where profit rates are higher and pay therefore tends to be higher. And men are more likely to be union members, which on average boosts their pay.
Discrimination contributes. In earlier eras it was common for employers to pay equally qualified women and men who worked in the exact same jobs differently. Today discrimination contributes to the gender pay gap mainly via differing pay levels for female-dominated and male-dominated jobs that require similar skill levels. It is difficult to estimate the share of the overall pay gap attributable to discrimination. Most studies simply assume that part or all of whatever portion of the gap is left unexplained after controlling for as many other factors as possible is due to discrimination. This might overstate the importance of discrimination because there may be other factors, such as on-the-job training, that aren’t effectively measured and thus can’t be included as control variables in statistical analyses. But it also could understate the role of discrimination because discrimination may contribute to differences in the types of jobs in which women and men work, or in their relative amounts of work experience.
A final contributor to the female-male pay gap is the overall degree of pay inequality. Imagine two countries with similar gender differences in productivity, similar degrees of occupational sex segregation, similar gender differences in union membership, and similar degrees of gender discrimination in pay. They might still have very different gender pay gaps depending on the overall degree of earnings inequality in the economy. For instance, if airline pilots earn about the same as real estate agents in one country but much more in the other, similar degrees of occupational sex segregation will yield different gender pay gaps. How far apart the rungs on the ladder are might matter as much or more than where the median woman stands on the ladder.
We can see the influence of this last factor when we compare across the rich democratic nations. Figure 9 shows that despite significant progress in the 1980s and 1990s, the United States has a larger pay gap than most of the other countries. This is partly because the rungs on our pay ladder are farther apart than elsewhere.19
Why did the pay gap shrink in the 1980s and 1990s? To some degree, this was a function of women’s rising educational attainment, their movement into traditionally male-dominated occupations, and declining pay discrimination. But the main cause was stagnation in male pay, as we can see in figure 10.
Why did the pay gap stop falling around 2000? As figure 10 shows, around 2000 pay stopped rising for the median-paid woman. The same is true of employment, as we saw earlier. One possibility is that these trends in pay and employment were influenced by a common cause, namely America’s inadequate supports for balancing work and family. According to this hypothesis, by 2000 we had gone as far as a nation without universal paid parental leave and affordable high-quality child care can get in terms of women in paid work. Similarly, too many women who do work have to take large chunks of time out to care for children (or other family members), which reduces their work experience, which limits their pay. The pay ratio among similarly-educated young women and men is about .93. But women later fall farther behind in part because they’re much more likely than men to interrupt their work career for family reasons.20
THE SECOND SHIFT
As we have seen, women have made striking progress in the labor market over the past generation. Yet as figure 11 shows, women’s self-reported happiness has declined, both absolutely and relative to men.
One hypothesis about why this has happened suggests that as women’s time in paid work has increased sharply, their husbands/partners haven’t sufficiently picked up the slack at home, which may increase frustration.21 Figure 12 shows trends in housework by women and men. The gap closed significantly between the mid-1960s and 2010, which is inconsistent with the hypothesis. However, the story is different for housework plus childcare hours among married mothers and fathers, as we see in figure 13. Here the downward trend among women ended in the mid-1970s. Since then there has been no further drop, and mothers continue to do much more second shift work than fathers.
Another possibility is that women, to a greater extent than men, feel conflicted by competing cultural models that hold out devotion to work and devotion to family as the highest ideal.22
Some “female” characteristics seem well-suited for top political decision-making positions: empathy, listening, willingness to compromise. However, women are underrepresented in top elected political positions in the United States. As figure 14 shows, there has been significant progress since 1990, but the level remains fairly low. That’s made clear when we compare across countries. Figure 15 shows that the US lags behind nearly all other rich democratic nations in the share of legislative seats held by women.
Why is women’s share of parliamentary seats so low in the United States? It isn’t because American women are more likely to lack education and professional experience, the standard credentials for elective office. Nor is it because Americans are more biased against women in politics.
One key cause is our winner-take-all single-member-district electoral system. Most other rich democracies have elections in which voters cast ballots for parties rather than candidates, with each party getting seats in the legislature in proportion to the share of the votes it receives. Given that many voters still aren’t fully accustomed to women as major elected politicians, it is easier for a woman to gain office via a party list than via US-style candidate-centered winner-take-all elections.23
A second key cause is quotas that major parties in some countries have adopted. This is a straightforward way to increase the number of women on party lists, and thus an effective way to increase the number who gain seats in parliament.24
It’s very unlikely that the United States will change its electoral system or that either of our two major parties will adopt quotas, so women’s progress in getting into top elected political positions may continue to be slow.
Another indicator of inclusion is safety from sexual assault and other types of violence. As the revelations from the “MeToo” movement suggest, sexual misconduct by men against women remains far too common. Unfortunately, we have no reliable over-time data that to give us a sense of whether there has been progress in this area or not.
We do have data on rape that go back at least several decades. Figure 16 shows data from victimization surveys. They suggest a slow but relatively steady decline since the early 1990s. We also have data from police reports. They go back farther in time, but they are less reliable because many rapes aren’t reported. They too suggest a reduction since the early 1990s, though to a level that remains higher than half a century ago.
Figure 17 shows victim reports of domestic violence — “intimate partner violence” with female victims. Half a century ago women could not press charges of rape against their husbands in most states. Since the early 1990s, according to the data, the incidence of domestic violence has fallen sharply.
MEN’S EMBRACE OF INCLUSION FOR WOMEN
What does public opinion data tell us about the degree to which men embrace inclusion for women? Figure 18 shows five indicators of men’s attitudes. All but one suggest progress.
Nearly all men say they would vote for a qualified woman for president, a sizable increase from the early 1970s. (It’s worth noting, though, that in the 2016 election only 41% of men voted for Hillary Clinton, compared to 52% of women.) In the mid-1970s only 30% of American men disagreed that “it is much better for everyone involved if the man is the achiever outside the home and the woman takes care of the home and family.” Now two-thirds do. About two-thirds agree that “because of past discrimination, employers should make special efforts to hire and promote qualified women,” up from around half in the 1990s. And nearly half of men say abortion should be legal no matter why the woman wants it, up about ten percentage points since the 1970s. The only exception to the pattern of growing embrace is a question asked four times by the World Values Survey. The share of American men disagreeing that “”when jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women” has fluctuated since the early 1990s, possibly decreasing but more likely holding constant.
Figure 19 allows us to see how the attitudes of American men compare to those of their counterparts in other affluent nations. The picture isn’t especially flattering. American men are among the least likely to say an essential characteristic of democracy is that women have the same rights as men, to disagree that men should have more right to a job when jobs are scarce, and to disagree that a university education is more important for a boy than for a girl.
The United States has made considerable strides toward inclusion of women. Women have caught up to men and surpassed them on most measures of educational attainment. Occupational sex segregation has decreased, as has the gender pay gap. More male partners and spouses are contributing to housework and child care. Women’s share of high-level elected political positions has been rising. Sexual assault has been falling.
Yet we remain a good distance from full inclusion. Occupational sex segregation and the gender pay gap appear to have stalled since the turn of the century. While women have made inroads in high-level corporate positions, they are still far underrepresented. Women’s movement into paid work has meant an increase in their average hours spent on paid work plus “second shift” work, which may have contributed to a decline in average happiness. The gap in elected political office has diminished, but it’s still quite large, and Americans have yet to elect a female president or vice president. And sexual violence and misconduct against women are still far too pervasive.
- Claudia Goldin, “The Quiet Revolution That Transformed Women’s Employment, Education, and Family,” American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings, 2006; Maria Charles, “A World of Difference: International Trends in Women’s Economic Status,” Annual Review of Sociology, 2011. ↩
- Hanna Rosin, “The End of Men,” The Atlantic, 2010. ↩
- Francine D. Blau and Lawrence M. Kahn, “Female Labor Supply: Why Is the United States Falling Behind?,” American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings, 2013; OECD, The Pursuit of Gender Equality, OECD, 2017, ch. 11. ↩
- Brigid Schulte and Alieza Durana, “The New America Care Report,” New America Foundation, 2016. ↩
- Lane Kenworthy, “A Decent and Rising Income Floor,” The Good Society. ↩
- OECD, Starting Strong II: Early Childhood Education and Care, 2006; Miriam Nordfors, “What Preschool Means in Sweden,” New York Times: Room for Debate, 2013. ↩
- OECD, Doing Better for Families, 2011. ↩
- Janet Gornick and Marcia Meyers, Families That Work, Russell Sage Foundation, 1993; Heather Boushey, Finding Time: The Economics of Work-Life Conflict, Harvard University Press, 2016. ↩
- These data are from Catalyst, catalyst.org. ↩
- Paula England, Comparable Worth: Theories and Evidence, Aldine de Gruyter, 1992; Barbara Reskin and Irene Padavic, Women and Men at Work, Pine Forge Press, 1994. ↩
- Jerry Jacobs, Revolving Doors: Sex Segregation and Women’s Careers, Stanford University Press, 1989. ↩
- Gary Becker, Human Capital, 3rd edition, University of Chicago Press, 1993; Solomon William Polachek, “Occupational Self-Selection: A Human Capital Approach to Sex Differences in Occupational Structure,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 1981. ↩
- Claudia Goldin and Cecilia Rouse, “Orchestrating Impartiality: The Impact of Blind Auditions on Female Musicians,” American Economic Review, 2000. ↩
- Support for this view can be found in the Bible’s New Testament: “Let a woman learn in silence with all subjection. But I suffer not a woman to teach, nor to usurp authority over the man, but to be in silence” (1 Timothy 2:11-12). Similarly, a Japanese proverb decrees that “For a woman to rule is as for a hen to crow in the morning.” ↩
- Rosabeth Moss Kanter, Men and Women of the Corporation, Basic Books, 1977. ↩
- Raymond Fishman, Sheena S. Iyengar, Emir Kamenica, and Itamar Simonson, “Gender Differences in Mate Selection: Evidence from a Speed Dating Experiment,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2006; Sendhil Mullainathan, “The Hidden Taxes on Women,” New York Times, 2018; Olle Folke and Johanna Rickne, “All the Single Ladies: Job Promotions and the Durability of Marriage,” unpublished, no date. ↩
- Sophie Ponthieux and Dominique Meurs, “Gender Inequality,” Handbook of Income Distribution, 2015; Francine D. Blau and Lawrence M. Kahn, “The Gender Wage Gap: Extent, Trends, and Explanations,” Discussion Paper 9656, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), 2016; OECD, The Pursuit of Gender Equality, ch. 12. ↩
- Gary Becker, “Human Capital, Effort, and the Sexual Division of Labor,” Journal of Labor Economics, 1985; England, Comparable Worth. ↩
- Lane Kenworthy, “Inequality and Sociology,” American Behavioral Scientist, 2007, figure 1. ↩
- YoonKyung Chung, Barbara Downs, Danielle H. Sandler, and Robert Sienkiewicz, “The Parental Gender Earnings Gap in the United States,” Center for Economic Studies, US Census Bureau, 2017; Claudia Goldin, “How to Win the Battle of the Sexes Over Pay,” New York Times, 2018. ↩
- Arlie Russel Hochschild with Anne Machung, The Second Shift, Viking, 1989. ↩
- Mary Blair-Loy, Competing Devotions: Career and Family Among Women Executives, Harvard University Press, 2003. ↩
- Lane Kenworthy and Melissa Malami, “Gender Inequality in Political Representation: A Worldwide Comparative Analysis,” Social Forces, 1999. ↩
- Aili Mari Tripp and Alice Kang, “The Global Impact of Quotas: On the Fast Track to Increased Female Legislative Representation,” Comparative Political Studies, 2008; OECD, The Pursuit of Gender Equality, ch. 14. ↩